THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY OF BRUNO SIMMA'S COMMENTARY

Bruno Simma et al. eds., The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary

Reviewed by
Alain Pellet
BOOK REVIEW

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This second edition of Bruno Simma’s masterpiece witnesses the deserved success of the first edition, published in the early 1990s in German, then English. It is a well-organized article-by-article commentary of the “constitution of the world community,” accompanied with some horizontal presentations which usefully summarize general issues of special interest.

Simma’s Commentary is not the first article-by-article commentary of the Charter of the United Nations. He has been preceded, for example, by Kelsen, Goodrich and Hambro, and Cot and Pellet, the last being comparable in many respects to the present work: the commentaries have been drafted by a collection of authors (eighty-two authors in Cot and Pellet; seventy-four in Simma) who share in common the same mother tongue. Beyond the diversity of points of view, this feature endows both books with some kind of unity, the “Frenchness” of Cot and Pellet’s contrasting in many respect with the “Germanness” of Simma’s.

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2. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY 1ST Ed.].
4. E.g., history, interpretation, self-determination, peacekeeping.
7. Jean-Pierre Cot & Alain Pellet, LA CHARTE DES NATIONS UNIES—COMMENTAIRE ARTICLE PAR ARTICLE (2d ed. 1991) (A third edition, which should be translated into English, is being prepared and should be published in late 2004).
8. See id. at xi–xiv; THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CHARTER COMMENTARY] (Curiously enough, in his preface, Simma only counts sixty-one authors. I have checked and I count seventy-four names).
While the first edition was initially written in German, then translated into English by the authors themselves, Simma's second edition only appears in English. Reasonably expanded, enriched by the contribution of twenty-two new authors or co-authors, the book is up to date until the end of 2001, a year when a new turning point took place in international relations and in the life of the United Nations following September 11. However, this new (and unfortunate) course has been partly anticipated by Simma and his team of authors.

As the editor writes in his preface: against the background of the new developments, the book claims to be “a strong plea to handle the only truly universal world organization that we have with greater care.” This was written with the Kosovo crisis in mind when “the world watched multilateral recourse to large-scale use of military force in the absence of Security Council authorization.” But, indeed, the worse was to come with the invasion of Iraq by a non-authorized self-proclaimed “coalition” based on a probably deliberate distortion of the true situation regarding mass-destruction weapons in that country and, more generally, the systematic recourse by the United States to unilateralism and the methodical calling into question of the international legal system as conceived after World War II by the Bush Administration.

In this respect, the Introduction to Chapter VII by Frowein and Krisch is particularly enlightening even though, seen in retrospect, it now appears somehow excessively optimistic. The authors show, both concisely and persuasively, how, after the end of the Cold War and a brief period of dramatically expanded use of the enforcement Charter mechanisms during the early 1990s, the Security Council developed more sophisticated, effective and better “targeted” instruments, which may sometimes be seen as exceeding the framework of the Charter as established in 1945 inasmuch as the measures taken amount to the exercise of a quasi-judicial function which does not belong to the Council.

9. Scarcely 150 pages more, which is a remarkable achievement given the tremendous changes in U.N. practice; the moderation of this increase witnesses the care with which the whole book has been reviewed and the dead wood pruned down.
10. The September 11th attack is only taken into consideration marginally. See Jochen Abr. Frowein & Nico Krisch, Introduction to Chapter VII, in CHARter COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 709, 726; Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in CHARter COMMENTARY, supra, at 802. Some commentaries include events as recent as spring 2002. See, e.g., Carl-August-Fleischhauer, Article 13, in CHARter COMMENTARY, supra, at 316 (non-ratification of the International Criminal Court treaty by the U.S.); Frowein & Krisch, supra, at 704 (economic sanctions).
11. CHARter COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at vii.
12. Id.
14. See also Frowein & Krisch, Article 41, in CHARter COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 738; Frowein & Krisch, Article 42, in CHARter COMMENTARY, supra, at 752–53.
According to Frowein and Krisch, this also holds true regarding the quasi-legislative functions, which may exceed the police function endowed to it. Resolution 1373 probably is the most extreme example of such a trend, which clearly implies a significant change in the general conception of the Charter.15

I share the concerns expressed by Frowein and Krisch, and I think that the U.N. is not a legislative body and should not be regarded as such. However, it has now become apparent that this "overextension" was but a paratheatrical and that, with the 2003 Iraqi crisis, the whole U.N. system has jumped out of the frying pan into the fire: it has been—partly—overused after September 11 and entirely ignored in the third Gulf War.16

In the concluding remarks of their remarkable commentary of Article 27, Simma, Brunner and Kaul write:

[In view of the developments that marginalized the role of the U.N. in the Kosovan case of 1998–99, the exercise of the veto in a manner consistent with the special responsibilities of the permanent members of the Security Council and only in instances when they consider a question of vital importance, taking into account the interests of the U.N. as a whole, must be seen as a condition for the survival of the Charter system of peace and security.17

This "Jean-Jacques Rousseau-like"18 approach is attractive at first glance but debatable upon further thought: the determination of what constitutes "a question of vital importance" is highly subjective as is the assessment of "the interests of the U.N. as a whole."19 Moreover, this proposal does not really meet the main point; the question is not so much the veto itself than the circumventing strategies used in order to overcome the threat of a veto. Both in Kosovo and during the 2003 Iraqi crisis, the simple threat of a veto by Russia (and probably China) in the


17. Bruno Simma et al., Article 27, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 521.


19. Simma et al., supra note 17; see also Jörge P. Müller & Robert Kolb, Article 2(2), in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8 (concerning good faith in the use of the veto power). According to Müller & Kolb, there is no satisfactory legal answer to the abuse of the veto, "the law of the Charter rests in this field more than anywhere else a lex imperfecta." Id. at 98.
first case, and by China, France and Russia in the second instance, de­
terred the "sermonizers" (NATO, then the U.S. and the U.K.) to come to the Security Council and persuaded them to do without its blessing in gross violation of the Charter.20

France, in particular, has been accused by the United States and the United Kingdom to have weakened the U.N., while, in that occurrence, it was the real "keeper" of the Charter and of the interests of the U.N. as a whole—if those interests are not seen in a short-sighted perspective. Accepting the U.S. diktat would, indeed, have kept up appearances of U.N. involvement, but it would have meant that the United Nations was used in the sole view of serving U.S. interests. Whatever the U.S. may think, its interests do not always and necessarily coincide with those of the rest of the world.

The U.S. volte-face vis-à-vis the worldwide organization, so clearly manifested in respect with September 11 on the one hand and the Iraqi crisis on the other hand, shows that the U.N. is now seen by the Bush Administration as a tool (of minor importance) for its hegemonic policy. The U.N., however, can also be used as a counterbalance to the now sole superpower.

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Like any treaty, the Charter is not a fossilized parchment; it is a living instrument, continuously enriched by interpretation and practice. As Judge Jessup put it in his dissenting opinion under the 1966 South West Africa case: "[t]reaties—especially multipartite treaties of a constitutional or legislative character—cannot have an absolutely immutable character."21 This is particularly true of the Charter.

As a result, several Articles of the Charter are now dead wood.22 This is the case of Article 26 foreseeing the establishment of a system

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22. Article 43 relating to agreements to be concluded by the Security Council with Members could be classified in such a category, even though Frowein and Krisch, rather optimistically, prefer to analyze it as a possible basis for future agreements. See Frowein & Krisch, supra note 10, at 763; see also Brun-Otto Bryde & August Reinisch, Article 47, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 775 (with respect to Article 47 relating to the Military Staff Committee).
for the regulation of armaments by the Security Council,23 and Article 107 on former World War II enemy states to which, nevertheless, Ress devotes a rather long (and interesting) commentary—a manifestation of the special sensitivity of Germany (and German authors) to this out-of-date issue.24 Also discussed—although rightly confined to forty pages—are Articles 75 to 91 on the now obsolete trusteeship system.25 Similarly, as noted by Fastenrath, “Article 73 has . . . largely fulfilled its task.”26

Moreover, the meaning of many articles has deeply changed with the development of and changes in the international society. As clearly apparent from Grewe and Khan’s introductory chapter, Drafting History, the United Nations is a creation of World War II; its creation then answered the needs of a world divided into two implacably opposed camps.27 The Cold War completely changed the deal and the organization had to adapt itself to the new situation: the opposition between the Western and Eastern “blocs” originated in a shift of—if not power, at least, importance—from the Security Council (paralyzed with the veto) to the General Assembly.

This shift had consequences not only in the field of the maintenance of international peace and security—as witnessed by the famous (sometimes held as being infamous—but alternatively by the various components of the international system) “Uniting for Peace Resolution.”28 This resolution, in turn, “served as an authorization for peace-keeping actions and for the convocation of special emergency sessions,”29 and also, and probably even more significantly, established the relative weight of the various subject matters within the competence of the U.N.

23. Han-Joachim Schütz, Article 26, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 464. According to Theodor Schweisfurth, Article 34 on the Security Council’s investigation on disputes or situations the continuation of which “is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security” also “fell asleep” in the early years of the U.N. [and] has remained in this state until now.” Theodor Schweisfurth, Article 34, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 606–07. This assertion, however, lays on a rather restrictive interpretation of this provision. See id. at 596–98.

24. Georg Ress, Article 107, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1330.

25. Dietrich Rauschnaig, Article 75, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1099–1139.

26. Ulrich Fastenrath, Article 73, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1096. Curiously (at least from a legal point of view), Fastenrath seems to hold Article 73 as applicable to “the French overseas départements,” although they are not listed among the non-self governing territories by the Decolonization Committee. Id.

27. Wilhelm Grewe & Daniel Erasmus Khan, Drafting History, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1.


29. Kay Hailbronner & Eckart Klein, Article 10, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 266.
As rightly stressed by several contributors, the General Assembly is "the world’s most important political discussion forum," and "provides an instrument for the member States through which the community interests of States may be expressed." This does not, by any means, imply that the General Assembly is "democratic" in the true meaning of the word; but in a world still legally based on sovereignty, "the only principal organ (art. 7(1)) of the U.N. in which all member States are represented" is seen as more "legitimate" than the Security Council in such a way that "[o]bviously, GA declarations convey strong indications of elements of the international ordre public." All the more so that, as very aptly shown by Nolte in his excellent presentation of Article 2(7), this provision, which "was intended to strengthen the protection of States against incursions into their domestic affairs ... has been increasingly eroded and emptied of substance," "This shift does, however, not simply amount to a greater restriction of sovereign equality of States. Rather, it involves an increase in importance of the ‘second pillar’ of sovereign equality, namely the rights of participation in the international community."

After a brief period during which the so-called “automatic majority" favored the interests of the West, a coalition of the communist countries and of the nascent Third World used the Assembly as a tool to challenge the existing international order.

As a first step, it was used in order to fight colonialism. It would be an exaggeration to uphold that decolonization was a consequence of this fight—the move towards liberation of colonized people had already widely started when the General Assembly adopted the celebrated Dec-

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30. Siegfried Magiera, Article 9, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 248; see also Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 29, at 258.
32. Democracy is based on the one person-one vote principle; it can hardly be transposed to an assembly of sovereign states, many of which cannot themselves be seen as democratic by any decent standard.
33. See Bardo Fassbender & Albert Bleckman, Article 2(1), in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 68, for a rather theoretical, but extremely stimulating, commentary on the notion of sovereignty.
34. Magiera, supra note 30, at 248.
35. Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 29, at 270.
36. Compare Georg Nolte, Article 2(7), in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 148, with Felix Ermacora, Article 2(7), in CHARTER COMMENTARY 1ST ED., supra note 2, at 139 (two very different commentaries of the same provision).
37. Nolte, supra note 36, at 171.
38. Fassbender & Bleckman, supra note 33, at 89.
39. This expression was forged in order to revile the “coalition” of the Third World and the communist block in the 1960s. In fact, it was just the symptom of common interests. Moreover, before 1960, the reverse was true and the East was usually isolated in the votes in the General Assembly.
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The General Assembly is "the only forum in which the community of nations can express, by any means, their true meaning of self-determination," the only forum in which member States are "called upon," the Security Council in its "secret deliberations," to make strong indications "that the aspiration of peoples has become increasingly more so that, as Article 2(7) of the Charter, the protection of States has to be interpreted more and more widely in order to ensure the validity of States. The General Assembly, the "second pillar" of the United Nations, is the international power of automatic majority. It is the only way in which the communist bloc can still be seen as a tool to "decolonize." It would be a consequence of this and the fact that we had already celebrated December 1960, "the Charter of Decolonization." It is not only in relation with the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that Lagoni and Landwehr rightly stress that "there is a need

to the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1960, to which, curiously enough, Fastenrath does not really give fairness. However, there can be no doubt that, by interpreting widely Article 73 of the Charter, by exercising continuous institutional pressure on the colonial powers and, above all, by promoting an anti-colonial interpretation of the right of peoples to self-determination, the General Assembly greatly contributed to accelerating and strengthening the trend towards decolonization.

In turn decolonization led to an impressive change and widening in the composition of the General Assembly itself which induced a new focus on the issues linked to the development of less developed countries. While of course not ignored, this aspect is probably played down in Simma's Commentary. Indeed, Wolfrum mentions that "[t]he word 'development' ... has become a keyword in the practice of the U.N." and devotes two paragraphs to the dead-born "new international economic order" (NIEO). But, except a mention to the notion of sustainable development "added" by the U.N. Rio Conference on Environment and Development of 1992, he does not analyze in depth neither the concept nor the reasons of the failure of the NIEO and just mentions in passing that "[s]ince its 53rd session [1998], the GA dealt with the problem how globalization and interdependence may bring about economic development." For their part, Hailbronner and Klein, in their evaluation of the role of the General Assembly, describe its evolution until the 1970s by distinguishing, as I have made above, between a first phase characterized by the General Assembly assuming an auxiliary function in the maintenance of peace, a second "decolonization phase" and a third one where "the GA has increasingly dealt with the revision of the world economic system." However, they do not deal with the actual situation nor do they analyze the impact of "[t]he dramatic political changes in the 1990s." It is only in relation with the U.N. Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) that Lagoni and Landwehr rightly stress that "there is a need

41. What has been called the "Charter of Decolonization" is just mentioned twice in passing in the (rather brief) commentary of Article 73 and its far-reaching scope is not underscored. See Fastenrath, supra note 26, at 1092-93.
42. An interpretation which was far from self-evident in view of both the travaux préparatoires of the Charter and the text of Article 73 (especially if compared with that of Article 76).
43. Rüdiger Wolfrum, Article 55(a) & (b), in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 901.
44. Id. at 907. However, it is fair to point out that Fassbender and Bleckmann analyze "Sovereign Equality in an Age of Globalization" in their commentary of Article 2(1).
45. Id. at 275.
for global (institutional) solutions to global socio-economic problems," but without elaborating anymore. One could legitimately ask whether the General Assembly has become "jobless" in the present period. Indeed, it continues adopting streams of resolutions on the most various topics. But their quantity hardly hides their limited meaning and scope: either the scope and purposes of the Charter as interpreted by the majority have been reached (e.g., decolonization), or are out of reach since the real debates take place elsewhere (e.g., economic matters, peace and security), or are so controversial that a consensus on significant progresses is highly improbable. This is the case, in particular, in the field of human rights. As shown by Riedel in his crystal-clear presentation of Article 55(c), the "programme" indicated by this provision has been largely fulfilled, at least on paper, with the adoption of the Bill of Rights (Universal Declaration on Human Rights plus the two 1966 Covenants) and "numerous U.N. resolutions, declarations and special human rights treaties." However, "a truly effective implementation of universally guaranteed human rights standards is still lacking," and does not seem attainable in the foreseeable future, when the sessions of the Human Rights Committee appear more and more as a mockery.

Similarly, after the quasi-completion of the decolonization process, the right of peoples to self-determination is anew an empty shell. In his "transversal" presentation, Doehring makes his best to give it a significant meaning by including "internal self-determination" in the concept. However, it must be recognized that such an interpretation is more within the sphere of wishful thinking than accepted as a positive legal norm by a majority of U.N. Members even if the 1992 Declaration on

47. Rainier Lagoni & Oliver Landwehr, Article 62, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1001.
48. Dealt with in the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO and, even more predominantly, within the private transnational sphere.
50. Eibe Riedel, Article 55(c), in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 917-41.
51. Id. at 940.
52. Curiously enough, Doehring asserts that "the practice of the [International Court of Justice] offers very few contributions to the interpretation of Art. 1(2) of the U.N. Charter." Karl Doehring, Self-Determination, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 55. This is not my opinion: the Court has greatly contributed to fixing the anti-colonial interpretation of the principle of self-determination of peoples. See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Counsel Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Oct. 16); East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); see also Doehring, supra, at 54-55 (Doehring rightly mentions all these decisions in his discussion).
the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities can be seen as a step in the good direction.\textsuperscript{54} Similarly, it is certainly acceptable that "a right of secession could ... be recognized if the minority discriminated against is exposed to actions by the sovereign State power which consist in an evident and brutal violation of fundamental human rights"; but, here again, this is more a doctrinal view than a reflection of a position taken by the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{55}

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This being said, according to the \textit{Charter}, the General Assembly is not without competence in the field of international peace and security, the first and main purpose of the United Nations. As explained by Hailbronner and Klein, "the GA may take 'effective collective measures' as stated in Art. 1(1), including the recommendation of collective measures" and such a power "was not first given to [it] through the Uniting for Peace Resolution, but rather can be said to belong to the GA by virtue of the spirit of the Charter itself."\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, Article 14 does not permit the General Assembly to undertake "intrusions" into the Security Council's peculiar sphere,\textsuperscript{57} nor does the \textit{Charter} give it any right to decide enforcement action by contrast with the powers belonging to the Council by virtue of Chapter VII, although it can be sustained that it could authorize such an action.\textsuperscript{58}

These possibilities, combined with the "dilution" of Article 12, should have encouraged the General Assembly to at least make recommendations and take positions on situations threatening or breaching the international peace.\textsuperscript{59} It has done so abundantly during the Cold War and again recently in some cases,\textsuperscript{60} and, in Resolution 47/120 B, it resolved "to make full and effective use of the functions and powers set out in Articles 10 and 14 of the Charter."\textsuperscript{61} However, as noted by Kimminich
and Zöckler, this “remarkable statement . . . has not been followed by determined activities” in spite of the Secretary-General’s encouragements.  

An outstanding example of this timorousness can be found in the remarkable abstention of the General Assembly to condemn—or, at least, address—the U.S. and U.K. armed attack against Iraq in spite of the wide condemnation of this action around the world and by an overwhelming majority of States.

This reserve of the world forum, supposedly the “conscience” of the international community, on a situation so clearly “resulting from a violation of the provisions of the . . . Charter setting forth the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations,” is but an illustration of the new state of international relations characterized not only by a weakening of the General Assembly but, more generally of the U.N., including the Security Council—theoretically vested with “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.”

This being said, there can be no doubt that, in the past, the General Assembly has proved able to make use of its powers rather expansively and a burst of energy cannot be excluded if the Third World finds new energy rather than continuing to be systematically kept out of world affairs. Such a reawakening is even less foreseeable with respect to the Security Council. I share the view of Hailbronner and Klein who state, “[t]he [relative] expansive use the GA has made of its powers is certainly less troubling than the [Security Council’s] inability to assert its leading role.” This is apparent both regarding role of the Security Council in the pacific settlement of disputes (Chapter VI) and with its supposed action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression (Chapter VII).

It must, however, be stressed right away that “[r]ecent [Security Council] practice . . . has to some degree blurred [the] line of separation” between both Chapters. As shown by Frowein and Krisch, during the last decade, the Council has exceeded the confines of its power to take binding measures as fixed when the Charter was adopted and then limited to the measures under Chapter VII. This has been particularly the case during the second Gulf war (after the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait), or at the occasions of the Bosnian war or of the Kosovo con-

62. See Kimminich & Zöckler, supra note 57, at 325.
64. Just Delbrück, Article 24, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 442.
65. Hailbronner & Klein, supra note 29, at 287.
66. Frowein & Krisch, supra note 10, at 721.
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... followed by the Secretary-General's encouragement...

in spite of an overall “quasi-legislative” function taken up by the Security Council.

... as rightly and clearly emphasized by Randelzhofer, supra note 10, at 790.

67. Id. at 706. The same can be said in respect of the “quasi-judicial” or “quasi-legislative” functions taken up by the Security Council. Id. at 708.

68. On this notion, see Ress, supra note 3, at 31.

69. Christian Tomuschat, Article 33, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 594.

70. Hermann Mosler & Oellers-Frahm, Article 92, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 1139.

71. Randelzhofer, supra note 10, at 790.

72. The French text of Article 51 uses the expression “agression armée,” a phrase which might imply a more massive and “governmental” use of force than an “armed attack.” This difference in wording might partly explain why French-speaking authors had more difficulties than their Anglophone counterparts to accept that the “armed attack” against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, clearly met the requirements of Article...
Randelzhofer the so-called “anticipatory self-defence” is incompatible with Article 51.73

As the ICJ put it in Nicaragua, “under international law in force today—whether customary international law or that of the United Nations system—States do not have a right of ‘collective’ armed response to acts which do not constitute an ‘armed attack.’ 74 This also holds true for “individual” responses. In such cases, armed reprisals are—supposedly—strictly prohibited and only collective security measures must come into play.

This of course presupposes that the finding of a breach of the principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force and its determination be made through a collective process. This is the object of Article 39 of the Charter, which entrusts the Security Council with this task while Articles 40 to 42 give it the responsibility to draw consequences from its finding by recommending or deciding the measures which ought to be taken. In so doing, the Council is vested with a large measure of discretionary power, only “subject to very few express [or, indeed, implicit] limitations,”75 deriving from (1) the purposes and principles of the U.N. embodied in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter itself; (2) jus cogens; and (3) the general principle of proportionality.76

It must be noted in this respect that while the Security Council has rarely found that a state was responsible for an act of aggression or a breach to the peace,77 it has broadly interpreted the notion of a “threat to the peace,” going as far as to designating as such ongoing conflicts.78 Under this broad definition, it has also included under the general denomination of “threats to the peace”: internal conflicts, violations of human rights and humanitarian law, violations of democratic principles, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.79

51. Another discrepancy between the English and the French texts can be found in Article 24 in which the English “primary responsibility” corresponds to the French “responsabilité principale” which appears to imply a lesser sense of priority.” Jost Delbrück, Article 24, in CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 8, at 442, 446.

73. Randelzhofer, supra note 10, at 803.
75. Frowein & Krisch, supra note 10, at 705.
76. Id. at 710–12.
77. See id. at 721–22.
78. Id. at 722–23. Resolution 1368 on the armed attack against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon goes as far as designating this single pattern of acts as a threat to the peace and an act of aggression (implicitly accepting that the U.S. was acting under self-defense).
This last category might prove of great importance in the future insofar as the U.S. relinquishes its "cowboy-like" policy and returns to the bosom of the United Nations in conformity with its commitments under the Charter.

In reality, the determination chosen by the Security Council under Article 39 is of little significance since, whatever it is, the same range of measures can be recommended (e.g., Article 40) or decided (e.g., Articles 41 and 42). Only self-defense under Article 51 is conditioned by the existence of an armed attack, which can be determined provisionally by the victim itself.

This being said, the whole mechanism is far from being satisfactory. Not only can the Security Council be paralyzed by the veto (and often is), but also, more often than not, the U.N. lacks the concrete means of handling the matter properly. The recent incapacity of the U.N. to face efficiently the civil war raging in Liberia has again shown it tragically; the same has been (or is) true in many other conflicts.

Agreements under Article 43 have not been concluded and the U.N. has no military force of its own. It is therefore entirely dependent on the good will of its members to carry out its functions in the field of the maintenance or reestablishment of peace. This is not incompatible with the Charter—Article 42 provides for "operations by ... forces of Members of the United Nations"—but it is a source of uncertainties and slowness. In order to partly overcome this highly unsatisfactory situation, the U.N. has established new and imaginative mechanisms, such as the now irreplaceable peacekeeping operations, "so as to compensate the functional disability of the [Security Council]."

According to Bothe, who presents them comprehensively in forty descriptive but most useful pages, preceded with a ten page "select bibliography," these very diverse operations "differ considerably from original conceptions concerning the maintenance of international peace and security." However, they concur with the accomplishment of the
main mission of the U.N. and doubts on their legality are out of place. This is also true concerning the enforcement actions which, more and more often, are “not entrusted to . . . genuine U.N. military operation[s] but rather to . . . specific groups of States,” the legality of which is hardly debatable.87

There can be no doubt that, failing the effective implementation of the enforcement mechanism imagined in San Francisco fifty-eight years ago, those substitutes are better than no mechanism at all. It is commonplace, however, to note that they are seriously inadequate and have not proved able to avoid or to stop countless conflicts of all kinds, thus leaving room to unilateralism in the name of what Fassbender and Bleckmann name “the untamed side of sovereignty.”88

Whether as a result or as a cause of this most unfortunate situation, there still exists a strong tendency among states to use force in order to make good their (alleged) rights—even without them being victims of an illegal use of force—in flagrant violation of Article 2(4) of the Charter, as well as of the law of state responsibility.89

It can be noted in this respect that the “interplay between the system of collective security and the régime of State responsibility”90 points both ways: breaches by states of their obligations under the Charter entail their international responsibility and the implementation of such obligations can be made through the law of state responsibility, in particular, by recourse to counter-measures.91 However, the determination of a breach by the Security Council “does not justify reactions that would otherwise be unlawful, and, therefore, does not expand the scope of the admissible use of force either.”92 Yet, in numerous cases, states have in-

86. Id. at 664. See also id., at 698-700 (enumerating and describing “armed forces created ad hoc by a group of States” and the “multinational forces . . . established under a mandate given by the [Security Council]”).
87. See the solidly argued, albeit prudent, demonstration of “the constitutionality of decentralized implementation” by Frowein and Krisch. Frowein & Krisch, supra note 10, at 756-58.
88. Fassbender & Bleckmann, supra note 46, at 90.
90. Frowein & Krisch, supra note 10, at 714.
91. On the other hand, it must be stressed that, “the system of collective security in the U.N. is not conceived as a reaction to a violation of international law, but as a preventive tool to ensure the maintenance of peace.” Id. at 721.
92. Id. at 714.
voked a finding by the Council under Article 39 of the Charter to justify unilateral military "sanctions."\footnote{149}

The same holds true a fortiori when the Security Council has not made any determination under Article 39. In such a case, with the exception of self-defense within the limits of Article 51, the use of military force is strictly, completely, and absolutely, prohibited by the Charter. Such a prohibition includes the so-called "humanitarian intervention" which Randelzhofer firmly and rightly condemns in unambiguous terms as a conclusion of a rigorous argumentation: "[u]nder the U.N. Charter, forcible humanitarian intervention can no longer ... be considered lawful."\footnote{194}

However, in many cases, if the Security Council remains silent or does not take effective measures in response to inhumane situations:

[T]here is a split between morality and law. It becomes more and more intolerable to see grave violations of human rights within a State and to see other States being banned by public international law to intervene. If the [Security Council] does not act on the basis of Arts. 39 and 42 to stop the violations of humanitarian law ... States will be tempted to intervene more and more often. Thus, eventually a rule of customary international law might develop, making humanitarian intervention lawful.\footnote{195}

It would be preferable that the practice of the [Security Council] makes the development of such a rule unnecessary.\footnote{195}

In a famous article published in 1970, Professor Thomas M. Franck asked, "who killed Article 2(4)?"\footnote{196} At the time, Professor Louis Henkin answered that, "the reports on the death of Article 2(4) are greatly exaggerated."\footnote{197} Randelzhofer, who echoes the debate, subscribes to the second view. So do ...
It must be admitted, however, that, if Article 2(4) has not yet been murdered, the U.S. is trying hard.\textsuperscript{99} If the present situation endures, it will succeed in its undertaking.

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The reading notes included here give but a pale idea of the richness of Simma's \textit{Commentary}. I have focused on the delicate legal and political issues. But it would be unfair not to mention the care given to less crucial Articles. Not all can be cited, but some deserve a special mention. This is so, in particular, for the remarkable presentations of Articles 52 and 54 (Hummer and Schweitzer), 53 (Ress and Bröhmer), 100 (Schreuer and Ebner), 101 (Göttelmann and Münch), 102 (Knapp and Martens), 104 (Seidl-Hohenveldern and Rudolph), and 108 and 109 (Karl, Müzelburg and Witschel). It is also worth noting the exceptionally complete and careful presentation of all the Articles concerning procedural issues in the General Assembly, the Security Council or the Economic and Social Council (ECSOC)—this might be a special trait of German "genius" . . .

All these commentaries concur to making the book not only a stimulating introduction to the crucial international issues of the present time but also an essential working tool for whoever "practices" the United Nations. Its usefulness is enhanced by numerous helpful tables,\textsuperscript{100} and by the precious table of cases and general index (even if the absence of an index of the treaties and resolutions cited is to be regretted).

In the preface, Professor, now Judge, Bruno Simma writes:

[\ldots] It is submitted that faithful stock-taking of more than half a century of U.N. practice and, more importantly, the constant checking of this practice against the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter with a view to providing guidance for future activities of the Organization and its member States, becomes more worthwhile than ever.\textsuperscript{100}

The editor of the commentary and his impressive team of authors have brightly fulfilled their part of the task. It is to be hoped that the organization and its member states will in turn play their card. The

\textsuperscript{99} And others as well. However, as the sole superpower, the U.S. bears a special responsibility. A country cannot claim world leadership and, at the same time, claim irresponsibility and leniency. All States are equal; some are "more equal" than others; the U.S. is the "most equal" of all.

\textsuperscript{100} \textit{See e.g., Charter Commentary, supra note 8, at 361–62 (General Assembly voting records); 391–98 (sessions); 433–36, 548–49 (lists of the subsidiary organs of the General Assembly and Security Council); 1045–47 (special procedures in the field of human rights).}

\textsuperscript{101} \textit{Id. at vii.}
international political context is not a source of great optimism in this respect—but works like Simma's Commentary could help to reverse the unfortunate trend we are witnessing.