The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties: A General Presentation by the Special Rapporteur

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Abstract

The purpose of this article is to revisit the long saga of the ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, as the Special Rapporteur has lived it for nearly 18 years and 16 reports. In its first part, the article recounts the elaboration procedure, pointing in particular to the elements of innovation and flexibility introduced in the process. The main one is the very type of instrument adopted, namely a Guide to Practice, and not a set of draft Articles that would eventually become a convention. In the second part, the main issues having retained the attention of the ILC, as well as of the other international bodies and of the academic community, are briefly recalled: the question of the unity or diversity of regimes, the permissibility of reservation and the status of the author of an impermissible reservation were among the most debated issues. Finally, the article explains the structure of the Guide to Practice.

On 11 August 2011, the International Law Commission (ILC) adopted a 630-page document1 entitled ‘Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties’. This ILC product is doubly unusual:

– it contrasts by its size with the usual drafts adopted by the Commission which are normally self-sufficient and stand by themselves, independently of the commentaries adopted by the Commission,2 while, in the present case, the ILC specified that

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2 The commentaries are nevertheless of the utmost importance in understanding and interpreting the ILC drafts, but they are not part of them and the drafts in question are, in principle, meant to be transformed into conventions – which is not the case with the Guide.
'the commentaries are an integral part of the Guide and an indispensable supplement to the guidelines';³
– it has been conceived from the start as a non-binding instrument with no vocation to be transformed into a convention,⁴ and is presented as such from the outset.⁵

The present article, the purpose of which is to introduce this very peculiar instrument, does not claim scientific objectivity. This author has devoted a non-negligible part of his working time for 18 years to preparing reports to the ILC on the topic of ‘Reservations to Treaties’ for which he was appointed the Special Rapporteur in 1994. These reports have been dissected, discussed, and in part rebuffed by the Commission or its Drafting Committee. However, even though, in some cases, the Commission made what I consider to be mistakes and undermined the global consistency of the draft, I must admit that, globally, the end-product has been improved owing to the careful scrutiny of the reports by the Commission or, more precisely, by a handful of able, interested colleagues whose input has been extremely positive, while the great majority seem to have been discouraged by the austere and technical character of the topic⁶ and some – one at least⁷ – have been extremely obstructive.

With this in mind, I will briefly describe the process which has led to the adoption of this instrument (1), before succinctly presenting some of the main issues and the more or less fortunate solutions adopted by the Commission (2).

1 The Process

The 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties⁸ devote six provisions to reservations: Article 2(1)(d) gives a definition of reservations for the purpose of the conventions, and Articles 19 to 23 provide general indications as to their legal regime. For its part, the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties confirms the 1969 definition⁹ and limits itself to summary regulations concerning the rights and obligations of newly independent states in matters of reservations.

³ Guide to Practice, supra note 1, at 34, para. 1.
⁴ See below, sub-section 2. A Special Kind of Instrument.
⁵ Guide to Practice, supra note 1, at 34, paras 2–5.
⁶ Regrettably as it may be, most members of the ILC (while all very respectable individuals) are no longer highly qualified international lawyers.
⁷ Special mention must be made in this respect to the Chinese member, Mr Huikang Huang, whose most regrettable anti-scientific attitude threatened the completion of the study and the final adoption of the Guide during the very last days of the 63rd session (2011): see in particular Provisional summary records of the 3121st meeting (9 Aug. 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3121; 3122nd meeting, 9 Aug. 2011, at 12–13); 3123rd meeting, 10 Aug. 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3123, at 16–19; and 3125th meeting, 11 Aug. 2011, A/CN.4/SR.3125, at 3 and 8–9.
⁹ See Art. 1(j).
Given the difficult technical issues posed by reservations, their practical importance in international legal life, and the incomplete and sometimes obscure character of the rules embodied in the Vienna Conventions, it appeared at the beginning of the 1990s that the topic of ‘the law and practice relating to reservations to treaties’ would be a good candidate for inclusion in the programme of work of the Commission, as had been recommended by its Planning Group in 1992. On this basis, the ILC decided to include the topic in its agenda in 1993 and, the following year, appointed its Special Rapporteur on the topic.

With excessive confidence – or recklessness – I then declared that ‘it does not seem unrealistic to think that the Commission would be in a position to adopt an initial set of draft articles, or a first draft to serve as a “guide” ... , within three or four years of the subject being included on its agenda and the appointment of a Special Rapporteur’. This was a genuine belief: I thought that I had been assigned a gentle little topic, technical in nature, which could be dealt with within a few years. I rapidly became disillusioned and realized that, as my illustrious predecessors had noted, ‘the subject of reservations to multilateral treaties is one of unusual – in fact baffling – complexity and it would serve no useful purpose to simplify artificially an inherently complex problem’ or, to put it in Reuter’s words, ‘even in the case of treaties between States, the question of reservations has always been a thorny and controversial issue, and even the provisions of the [1969] Vienna Convention may not have eliminated all these difficulties’; moreover, the topic brings with it an emotional charge at the political level which I had underestimated and which made things even more complicated. Indeed, 18 years seems – and is – too much and I have my share

10 Yrbk ILC (1992), II(2), at 54, para. 368. The pretext invoked by the Working Group which was at the origin of this proposal was that ‘various delegations’ had suggested during the debates of the Sixth Committee of the GA the previous year that it would be a possible topic (see Topical summary, prepared by the Secretariat, of the discussion in the Sixth Committee on the report of the ILC during the 46th session of the GA, Doc. A/CN.4/L.469, at para. 422); in reality, it seems that only one delegation (Sweden, in the name, it is true, of the Nordic countries) had made such a suggestion: GA, 6th Committee, Summary Record of the 37th meeting, 13 Nov. 1991, Doc. A/C.6/46/SR.37, at 14, para. 72; but the Commission was short of topics, the GA obstinately made no request for new studies by the ILC and the topic met the criteria for codification and progressive development (see the working paper written by the present author; outlines prepared by Members of the Commission on Selected Topics of International Law in ILC, reproduced in Doc. A/CN.4/454, Yrbk ILC (1993) II(1), at 228–237.

11 See Yrbk ILC (1993), II(2), at 96–97, paras 427–430 and 440. This decision was approved by GA res. 48/31 of 9 Dec. 1993 (para. 7).

12 Yrbk ILC (1994), II(2), at 179, para. 381.

13 Yrbk ILC (1993), II(1), at 335, para. 55; see also 2nd Report on Reservations to Treaties: ‘the Special Rapporteur feels that, subject to unforeseen difficulties, the task can and should be carried out within four years’; Doc. A/CN.4/477, Yrbk ILC (1996), II(1), at 51, para. 54.


15 Mr Paul Reuter, 10th report on the question of treaties concluded between States and international organizations or between two or more international organizations, Doc. A/CN.4/341 and Add. I, Yrbk ILC (1981), II(1), at 56, para. 53.

16 The ‘sharia reservations’ is but the most striking example of the political sensitivity of the subject. More generally, reservations to human rights conventions, although they are by no means special legally speaking, are the object of harsh doctrinal and ideological debates.
of responsibility for this excessive length; but the difficulty of the topic would certainly have excluded an acceptable outcome in the short period of time I had in mind when we started tackling it.

Besides its relative length, the process which led to the adoption of the rather special instrument constituted by the Guide to Practice (B) is relatively classical, in that the ILC did not fundamentally move away from its usual practice (A).

### A Mainly Classical Process

Once on the agenda of the Commission, the topic was mostly dealt with in the usual way.

The Special Rapporteur first prepared a ‘Preliminary Report’ in which, after having summarized the previous work of the Commission on reservations, he tackled two main topics: (1) the problems left in abeyance, and (2) the possible forms of the results of the work of the Commission on the topic. This second point was somewhat unusual in that, normally, the Commission decides on the final form of its drafts at the very end of its work on a topic. However, in the present case, the Special Rapporteur urged an early decision and insisted on the specificity of the issue in relation to pre-existing treaty rules on the question. An early decision seemed necessary since you do not (or, at least, should not) draft a draft convention in the same way as you draft guidelines or recommendations.

In Chapter 1 of his preliminary report, the Special Rapporteur detailed the previous work of the Commission on reservations, on the occasion of the preparation of each of the three conventions on the law of treaties of 1969, 1978, and 1986. The present article is certainly not the appropriate place to summarize these rather lengthy developments; however, one thing was striking: the incredibly conservative approach of the Commission. While, the ICJ had promoted a creative methodology to deal with the validity of reservations inspired by the pre-war Pan-American practice, the ILC – whose statutory functions are both ‘the promotion of the progressive development of international law and its codification’, resisted the adoption of the indispensable

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17 The elaboration of other ILC drafts has lasted even longer. Thus the topic of Responsibility of States was put on the agenda of the Commission in 1949 and approved by the GA in 1954 (GA Res. 799 (VIII), 7 Dec. 1953) (not to speak of the LoN attempts) and the final Arts were adopted in 2001; similarly, the Draft Arts on International liability in case of loss from transboundary harm arising out of hazardous activities were adopted in 2006 after having been on the ILC agenda since 1973 (GA Res. 3071 (XXVIII), 30 Nov. 1973).


20 And this is why I tend to disapprove of the usual practice of the Commission of waiting until the last minute to decide on the form of its drafts. Concerning the Guide to Practice, the early decision taken on this point had important consequences for the substance of the guidelines.

21 See 1st Report, supra note 18, at 126–141, paras 8–90.


‘flexible principle’ for more than a decade. It was not until Sir Humphrey Waldock’s first report,\textsuperscript{24} in 1962, that the Commission changed its mind and at last sanctioned the fortunate progress promoted by the Court.

However, the recognition of the flexible approach (retained in the 1969 Convention) was clearly the result of a compromise reached thanks to a great deal of ambiguity.\textsuperscript{25} As explained in the first report on reservations to treaties:

The most remarkable of these ambiguities results from the exact role of the ‘criterion’ of the compatibility of the reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty, to which the Convention ‘doctrinally’ pays tribute, but from which it does not draw any clear-cut conclusions.\textsuperscript{26}

The most perplexing question in this respect is the relationship between Article 19 of the Vienna Convention,\textsuperscript{27} which sets out the rules concerning the ‘Formulation of reservations’ – in reality their validity – on the one hand, and Article 20, which concerns ‘Acceptance of and objection to reservations’ – in reality their opposability.\textsuperscript{28} If you put the emphasis on the former provision, you will be seen as belonging to the ‘permissibility school’, in contrast to the ‘opposability school’, which focuses on the reactions of other states, as envisaged in Article 20.\textsuperscript{29}

The first report also highlighted various other ambiguities, lacunae, and shortcomings of the Vienna Conventions,\textsuperscript{30} while emphasizing the global success of the reservations regime.\textsuperscript{31} Moreover, it was noted that:

the 1969 Vienna Convention is, at one and the same time, the culminating point of a development which began long ago and which consists in facilitating participation in multilateral conventions to the maximum extent while preserving their purpose and their object, and the starting point of a multifaceted and not always consistent practice, which, on the whole, seems to be much more the result of considerations of political expediency based on a case-by-case approach than of firm legal beliefs.\textsuperscript{32}


\textsuperscript{25} 1st Report, \textit{supra} note 18, at 132, paras 44–46.

\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}, at 136, para. 61(b).

\textsuperscript{27} In the present article, absent a precision to the contrary, I will reason on the basis of the 1969 Vienna Convention. However, it must be noted that the guidelines included in the Guide to Practice follow the model of the 1986 Convention which is more comprehensive, in that it includes the rules applicable to treaties to which an international organization is a party.

\textsuperscript{28} ‘One of the main “mysteries” of the reservations regime established by the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions is clearly that of the relations which exist, might exist, or should exist, between article 19, on the one hand, and the following articles, on the other’: 2nd Report, \textit{supra} note 13, at 70, para. 177.


\textsuperscript{30} 1st Report, \textit{supra} note 18, at 146–150, paras 126–149.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, at 151–154, paras 153–169.

\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Ibid.}, at 152, para. 162.
Under these circumstances the (challenging) road map of the Commission seemed rather obvious: the future instrument should

- preserve the substantial achievements embodied in the Vienna Conventions;
- take into account the subsequent developments;
- fill the gaps and eliminate the very many ambiguities which sprinkle the text of the Conventions with respect to reservations.

With this in mind, the Commission endorsed the conclusions of the Special Rapporteur which constituted, ‘in the view of the Commission, the result of the preliminary study requested by [the] General Assembly’:33

(b) The Commission should try to adopt a guide to practice in respect of reservations. In accordance with the Commission’s statute and its usual practice, this guide would take the form of draft articles whose provisions, together with commentaries, would be guidelines for the practice of States and international organizations in respect of reservations; these provisions would, if necessary, be accompanied by model clauses[34];
(c) The above arrangements shall be interpreted with flexibility and, if the Commission feels that it must depart from them substantially, it would submit new proposals to the General Assembly on the form of the results of its work might take;
(d) There is a consensus in the Commission that there should be no change in the relevant provisions of the 1969, 1978 and 1986 Vienna Conventions.35

These directives were followed during the whole process of the elaboration of the Guide. In spite of accusations of disloyalty, the Special Rapporteur established himself as the watchful guardian of fidelity to the text of the Conventions – which is integrally reproduced in the Guide.36 And, while not conceived as being eligible to become a binding instrument,37 the Guide appears in effect as a succession of provisions (called ‘guidelines’ and not ‘Articles’), explained by abundant commentaries introducing the relevant case law, practice, and doctrinal views.

The next stages should logically have been a proposition for the future work of the Commission on the basis of its conclusions adopted in 1995 and a discussion of the definition of reservations. However, the second report on reservations to treaties deals with only the first of those aspects; its first chapter describes the area to be covered by the study of the Commission and its form, and sketches out the general outline of the study38 – an

34 In spite of an attempt to introduce alternative model clauses on the deferment of the effective date of the withdrawal of a reservation, on an earlier effective date of withdrawal of a reservation, and on the freedom to set the effective date of withdrawal of a reservation (Report of the ILC on the Work of its 54th Session, Yrbk ILC (2002), II(2), at 19, para. 62), the final version of the Guide does not include any model clause.
36 See the correlation table in Annex I to this article.
37 See infra, sub-section A, A Special Kind of Instrument.
38 Cf. 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 43–51, paras 1–54. Sect. A of the first ch. is devoted to a reminder of the 1st Report on Reservations to Treaties and the Outcome (and the habit has been formed to introduce the following reports with a reminder of the previous ‘episodes’ together with an account of the recent developments (mainly in the jurisprudence) concerning reservations). Sect. B of this first ch. bears upon ‘The Future Work of the Commission on the Topic of Reservations to Treaties’.
outline which was globally followed during the subsequent work of the Commission on the topic. The second chapter of the second report was different in nature. It was entitled ‘Unity or diversity of the legal regime for reservations to treaties’ and sub-titled ‘Reservations to human rights treaties’.

The Special Rapporteur considered that there were necessity and urgency for the consideration of the question – which had already been raised with some insistence during the debates in the ILC and the Sixth Committee the previous year – by the Commission: in regional contexts, human rights courts had taken positions which could be seen as hardly defensible with regard to the Vienna rules on reservations and, above all, the Human Rights Committee had just adopted, on 2 November 1994, its General Comment number 24 on reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been vigorously opposed by three states – and not insignificant ones.

The crux of the issue was whether it was open to a human rights body to assess the validity of reservations to ‘its’ convention and, in the event of an affirmative answer, what the effect of such an assessment was. As explained in the second report:

While it is obviously fundamental for human rights bodies to state their views on the question, the Commission must also make heard the voice of international law in this important domain, and it would be unfortunate for it not to take part in a discussion which is of concern to the Commission above all.

Based on this observation, the Special Rapporteur studied the issue of reservations to human rights treaties in the more general context of reservations to ‘normative treaties’ following a two-stage approach:

– he first wondered whether it would be justified to apply a different regime to reservations to treaties of these kinds (normative and, more practically, human rights treaties); then,

39 See the ‘Provisional Plan of the Study’, ibid. at 48–49, para. 37.
40 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 52–82, paras 55–260.
41 For a detailed presentation of the reasons for this urgency see ibid., at 52–53, paras 56–63.
44 See the extremely critical remarks on General Comment No. 24 by the US, the UK (ibid., Annex VI), and France (ibid., 51st Session, Supplement No. 40 (A/51/40), i. Annex VI).
45 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 53, para. 62.
46 The peculiarity of these ‘normative’ conventions is ‘that they operate in, so to speak, the absolute, and not relatively to the other parties – i.e., they operate for each party per se, and not between the parties inter se – coupled with the further peculiarity that they involve mainly the assumption of duties and obligations, and do not confer direct rights or benefits on the parties qua states, that gives these Conventions their special juridical character’: Fitzmaurice, ‘Reservations to Multilateral Conventions’, 2 ICLQ (1953) 1, at 15.
– having firmly answered in the negative,48 he dealt with the question of the role of the treaty monitoring bodies in the implementation of this regime.49

By way of conclusion, the Special Rapporteur suggested that the Commission could adopt a resolution on reservations to normative multilateral treaties, including human rights treaties, a draft proposal of which was annexed to his second report. Although, on the substance, the propositions made by the Special Rapporteur were rather well received by the members of the ILC, the very idea of a resolution was rejected on the pretext that it was ‘a somewhat unusual procedure, ... premature at the present stage of the Commission’s work on the topic ... [and that] the text crystallized positions which were not yet entirely clear-cut and which might subsequently be changed’.50 They were replaced by ‘Preliminary Conclusions of the International Law Commission on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties’51 adopted by consensus,52 the status of which was even more uncertain.

Although the principles embodied in these ‘Preliminary Conclusions’ were rather balanced,53 they received a fairly cold reception, to say the least, from human rights bodies and activists.54 Until the very last stages of the study,55 the question of the special regime, vel non, for reservations to human rights treaties remained an object of debates and a source of concern for the ILC and its Special Rapporteur. Various meetings were organized with human rights bodies and the Sub-Commission on Human Rights either individually or globally.56 Although it was a time- and energy-consuming process, it has undoubtedly facilitated a better mutual understanding and it enabled me to have a better understanding of the issues and to propose what I think were more appropriate and realistic solutions than the ones initially envisaged.57

48 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 67, para. 163.
49 Ibid., at 67–82, paras 164–252.
51 Ibid., at 57, para. 157.
52 Yrbk ILC (1998), I, at 159, para. 4.
53 Good evidence of their balanced character is that they were not only criticized by the human rights bodies and activists, but also by many states from various sensitivities: see 4th Report on Reservations to Treaties, Doc. A/CN.4/499, Yrbk ILC (1999), II(1), at 129–131, paras 10–16.
54 See in particular: 3rd Report on Reservations to Treaties, Doc. A/CN.4/491 and Add. 1–6, Yrbk ILC (1998), II(2), at 231, para. 16, describing the reactions received from the Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee and 4th Report, supra note 53, at 129, para. 11 concerning the feedback given by the Committee against Torture.
56 As was the case in 2007, when the Commission promoted a two-day meeting with representatives of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the Human Rights Committee; the Committee against Torture; the Committee on the Rights of the Child; the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women; the Committee on Migrant Workers; the Council of Europe (European Court of Human Rights and the Committee of Legal Advisers on Public International Law (CAHDI)); and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights: see Summary of discussions, held in 2007, with UN and other experts in the field of human rights, including representatives from various human rights treaty bodies, prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Doc. ILC(LIX)/RT/CRP.1.
57 See infra, in particular the solution retained in guideline 4.5.3 (Status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to the treaty).
This human rights excursion was the main derogation to the usual codification process through the ILC. For the rest, the Special Rapporteur submitted his reports to the Commission, which, as is usual, introduced draft guidelines. The reports were discussed in plenary, which then sent the draft guidelines to the Drafting Committee, which carefully discussed them (and, sometimes, rather deeply modified them, usually for the better, sometimes for the worse). The new drafts were re-discussed in plenary and usually adopted without any change, which enabled the Special Rapporteur to prepare the commentaries on the guidelines for inclusion in the report of the Commission after discussion in the plenary.

Then, and equally as usual, the guidelines and their commentaries were discussed by the Sixth Committee as parts of the Report of the Commission. Leaving aside the too often stereotyped character of the speeches in the Sixth Committee and the lack of preparation of too many delegations, there is clearly something wrong in this cycle of exchanges between the ILC and the Committee. Other than by transforming its drafts in a Penelope’s tapestry, the Commission cannot take into account the remarks made in the Sixth Committee – at least when they are made: it is only on the occasion of the second reading that the ILC can adapt its drafts in view of the states’ remarks. When a study spreads over a long period of time, it would in any case make no sense to change

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58 May I say that it was a fortunate infringement and that the ILC may find it beneficial for its future projects to consult more with other expert bodies?

59 Instead of draft Arts – on the choice of the word ‘guideline’ see infra. The Special Rapporteur submitted 17 reports between 1995 and 2011 inclusive (no report was prepared in 1997: two were circulated in 2010); all of which can easily be found on the website of the Commission. The easiest way to find them being to use the Analytical Guide (http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/1_8.htm); see the list of the reports by the Special Rapporteure in Annex II to this article. The 16th Report, which was devoted to the ‘Status of reservations, acceptances of and objections to reservations and interpretative declarations in the case of succession of States’ (Doc. A/CN.4/626) was preceded and amply facilitated – the topic is formidable! – by a remarkable paper prepared by the Secretariat (6 May 2009, Reservations to Treaties in the Context of Succession of States: Memorandum by the Secretariat, Doc. A/CN4/616, 26 pp.).

60 In only three instances did the Commission postpone the referral of draft guidelines to the Drafting Committee (such was the case for draft guideline 3.1.5 (Definition of the object and purpose of the treaty), for which the Special Rapporteur considered that further reflection was needed, in the light of the discussions held in the Commission: see 11th Report on Reservations to Treaties, Doc. A/CN.4/574, at para. 4; also for draft guidelines 3.3.2 (Nullity of invalid reservations), 3.3.3 (Effect of unilateral acceptance of an invalid reservation), and 3.3.4 (Effect of collective acceptance of an invalid reservation) which could not be considered until the Commission adopted the guidelines on the effect of objections to and acceptance of reservations: see the Report of the ILC on the Work of its 58th Session, Official Records of the GA, 61st Session, Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/61/10, at para. 157; the same situation occurred in relation to draft guidelines 3.5.2 and 3.5.3 on the validity of conditional interpretative declarations, the consideration of which was seen as premature in 2009, the ILC having not yet at the time considered the validity of the reservations: see Report of the ILC on the Work of its 61st Session, Official Records of the GA, 64th Session, Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/64/10, at para. 68.

61 Globally, I have enjoyed this usually very fruitful – sometimes exasperating – exercise. I have, however, regretted that the attendance at the meeting of the Drafting Committee was usually limited to a few members, usually professors from Europe or the WEOG Group, most other members being conspicuous by their absence. I take this opportunity to pay special tribute to Profs Gaia and McRae and to Sir Michael Wood, whose constructive criticisms and suggestions have been exceptionally helpful, particularly for the ultimate completion of the study.
a work in progress every year. This is why I made a point of reviewing, as carefully as
possible, all the interventions made by the delegates to the Sixth Committee over the
years when we had to prepare the final version of the Guide. And this probably was the
most unusual aspect of the preparation of the Guide.

Normally, the ILC’s drafts are subject to two different readings, separated by a one
year fallow period during which states can prepare and send in their comments on the
global draft adopted on first reading. This has not been the case concerning the Guide
to Practice. It was completed at a forced march during the years 2009 and 2010 and,
in accordance with the General Assembly’s wish, a final version was completed in
2011 – the text being adopted by consensus on 11 August of that year. To achieve
this result, the Commission and the Secretariat (including the translators) had to make
tremendous efforts and, in this respect too, a somewhat unusual method was followed:

– contrary to custom, the Special Rapporteur did not present a specific report intro-
ducing in a systematic manner the comments received from the Governments;
– the Special Rapporteur had prepared two informal documents: a *compendium*
of all the written and oral remarks received from Governments during the whole
18 years when the topic had been on the agenda of the Commission, and a
reviewed text of the guidelines established in view of these remarks;
– these documents were widely used by the open-ended Working Group established
by the Commission (instead of the Drafting Committee which was not seised of
the topic during the 63rd session);
– the Working Group was able to adopt the text of the guidelines modified in view of
the comments of the Governments and the suggestions of the Special Rapporteur
following a marathon of 14 meetings held from 26 April to 18 May 2011.

62 While the Guide to Practice includes 179 guidelines (199 in the 2010 version), 89 new guidelines were
adopted in 2009 and 2010 – and among them are most of the most important ones.
63 By its resolution 65/26 of 6 Dec. 2010, the GA invited ‘Governments to submit to the secretariat of the
Commission, by 31 January 2011, any further observations on the entire set of draft guidelines consti-
tuting the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties, provisionally adopted by the Commission at its
sixty-second session, with a view to finalizing the Guide at the sixty-third session’: para. 4.
64 In the very unusual rhythm of this completion, the ILC and the Special Rapporteur avoided
speaking of a ‘second reading’.
65 In spite of the unfortunate last minute difficulty created by the Chinese member: see supra note 7.
66 Provisional Summary Record of the 3125th Meeting, 11 Aug. 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3125. A conjunc-
tion of reasons can explain this haste. Both the ILC and the Sixth Committee wished to finish with the
topic, whose study had lasted much longer than initially envisaged. Moreover, I had made public my firm
decision not to run for a sixth term as a member of the Commission and it was apparent that no member
was keen to take over the role of Special Rapporteur on the topic.
67 See Reservations to Treaties. Comments and Observations Received from Governments, 15 Feb. 2011,
68 The Working Group was chaired with great distinction and efficiency by the Ecuadorian member of the
Commission, Mr Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez. As had been the case in the Drafting Committees which, in
the previous years was in charge of reservations to treaties (see supra note 61), only a handful of mem-
bers, mainly from the WEOG, were active in the Working Group.
69 Oral Report by the Chairman of the Working Group on Reservations to Treaties, Mr Marcelo Vázquez
Bermúdez, 20 May 2011.
– fortunately, this could be achieved by the end of the first part of the 63rd session of the Commission,70 which allowed the Special Rapporteur (with the very helpful assistance of young researchers in international law)71 to review and redraft the commentaries on the guidelines as finally adopted by the Commission during the break between the two parts of the session;
– the commentaries thus updated and adapted were (usually briefly) discussed and adopted by the Commission during the second part of the session.

Equally, during the second part of the session, the same Working Group was entrusted with the task of reviewing and finalizing the text of a draft recommendation or conclusions on the reservations dialogue and of a draft recommendation on technical assistance and assistance on the settlement of disputes proposed by the Special Rapporteur in his 17th report. Both texts were adopted by the Commission with some changes but were given different status: the Conclusions on the reservations dialogue constitute an annex to the Guide to Practice;72 for its part, the Recommendation of the Commission on mechanisms of assistance in relation to reservations to treaties has been included in the Report of the Commission to the General Assembly,73 but is not part of the Guide.

B A Special Kind of Instrument

By contrast with the relatively classical process which led to its adoption, the Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties is a very special kind of instrument.

As explained above, the ILC decided at a very early stage of its study of the topic of reservations to treaties on the form the project was to take: instead of drafting an instrument eligible to be transformed into a convention, it was decided as early as 1995 that, subject to a possible change of mind, the Commission would draft a Guide to practice made of guidelines accompanied by commentaries. This carefully chosen terminology made clear from the outset that the Commission was not turning towards a binding instrument. And this was confirmed at the very end of its study when:

At its 3125th meeting, on 11 August 2011, the Commission decided, in accordance with article 23 of its Statute, to recommend to the General Assembly to take note of the Guide to Practice and ensure its widest possible dissemination.74

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70 As is now usual, the 63rd session was split into two parts, respectively from 26 Apr. to 3 June and from 4 July to 12 Aug. 2011.
71 In particular Daniel Müller, Arnaud Tournier, María Alejandra Etchegorry, and Alina Miron; the author is also most grateful to the last for her assistance in finalizing this article.
73 Report of the ILC on the Work of its 63rd Session, Official Records of the GA, 66th Session, Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/66/10, at 18–19, para. 73. By this recommendation, the ILC ‘Suggests that the GA:

1. Consider establishing a reservations assistance mechanism, which could take the form described in the annex to this recommendation;

2. Consider establishing within its Sixth Committee an “observatory” on reservations to treaties, and also recommend that States consider establishing similar “observatories” at the regional and subregional levels”, while an annex summarily sketches the “reservations assistance mechanism” could be.’
74 ILC Report (2011), supra note 73, at 18, para. 72.
This makes clear that, unlike most products of the ILC, the Guide to Practice has not been designed as the basis for the adoption of a convention; deliberately so; and from the very beginning of the process. If the General Assembly follows the ILC’s recommendation, it will remain what it is now: a soft law instrument mixing, however, hard rules with soft recommendations.

The reasons for this ‘modest approach’ were explained by the Special Rapporteur in his preliminary report:

166. [W]hat should be termed a ‘modest approach’ certainly offers great advantages:
(a) Amendment of the existing provisions would run into considerable technical difficulty: a State party to one of the existing conventions in force, or that might become a party, might very well refuse to accept such amendments as could be adopted: the result would be a dual legal regime of reservations that would be the source of very great difficulty under international law – at the present stage of its development, there is no means of imposing harmonization of the rules in force;
(b) … if the Commission could undertake the task of clarifying the existing provisions, that would at least make it possible to overcome most of the difficulties encountered;
(c) In their statements in the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly in 1993 and 1994, the representatives of States … expressed their support for the existing provisions. Above all, whatever their defects, the rules adopted in 1969 have proved their worth in that, on the one hand, they comply with the objective of flexibility which seems to have the support of States as a whole and, on the other, although their application gives rise to some difficulties, it has never degenerated into a serious dispute and, although, from the standpoint of principle, the protagonists have in some cases remained on opposite sides, they have always been reconciled in practice.

These reasons were at the origin of the decision to stick to the existing treaty law as embodied in the three Vienna Conventions and to adopt a non-binding instrument whose aim would only be ‘filling the gaps and . . . removing the ambiguities in the existing rules, but without embarking on their amendment’.

The option for a non-binding instrument complying with the three existing Vienna Conventions was never put into question later on. As explained in the Introduction to the Guide:

as the title and the word ‘guidelines’ indicate, it is not a binding instrument but a *vade mecum*, a ‘toolbox’ in which the negotiators of treaties and those responsible for implementing them should find answers to the practical questions raised by reservations, reactions to reservations and interpretative declarations, on the understanding that, under positive law, these answers may be more or less certain depending on the question, and that the commentaries indicate doubts that may exist as to the certainty or appropriateness of a solution.

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75 At the time when this article was written (June 2012), the Sixth Committee had not yet taken a decision in this respect: due to its length, the Guide to Practice could not be circulated in all the six official languages of the GA and its examination was reported to the 67th session of the GA (Oct.–Nov. 2012). Consequently, in its resolution 66/98 the GA decided ‘that the consideration of chapter IV of the report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 63rd session, dealing with the topic ‘Reservations to Treaties’, shall be continued at the sixty-seventh session of the General Assembly, during the consideration of the report of the Commission on the work of its sixty-fourth session’ (Doc. A/RES/66/98, 9 Dec. 2011, at para. 5).

76 1st Report, *supra* note 18, at 153, para. 166, footnotes omitted.


Therefore, the Guide to Practice has been conceived as a means to assist practitioners, not as a united collection of rules compulsory for them. As a result, the guidelines have very different legal values, from pure recommendations to fully binding rules – not because they appear in the Guide, but because they have acquired (independently of the Conventions and, \textit{a fortiori}, of the Guide) the status of customary rules. The Introduction to the Guide distinguishes between three levels of obligatoriness for the guidelines:

- Some of them simply reproduce provisions of the Vienna Conventions which set out norms that were either uncontroversial at the time of their inclusion in the Conventions or have since become so as such, while not peremptory in nature, they are nevertheless binding on all States or international organizations, whether or not they are parties to the Conventions;
- Other rules contained in the Vienna Conventions are binding on the parties thereto, but their customary nature is open to question; reproducing them in the Guide to Practice should contribute to their crystallization as customary rules;
- In some cases, guidelines included in the Guide supplement Convention provisions that are silent on modalities for their implementation but these rules are themselves indisputably customary in nature or are required for obvious logical reasons;
- In other cases, the guidelines address issues on which the Conventions are silent but set out rules the customary nature of which is hardly in doubt;
- At times, the rules contained in the guidelines are clearly set out \textit{de lege ferenda} and, in some cases, are based on practices that have developed in the margins of the Vienna Conventions;
- Other rules are simply recommendations and are meant only to encourage.\footnote{Ibid., at 34–35, para. 3 of the Introduction, footnotes (giving examples of each category) omitted.}

This last category is particularly significant: it could not have been considered to include in a draft convention a provision according to which, ‘[w]hen providing bodies with the competence to monitor the application of treaties, States or international organizations should specify, where appropriate, the nature and the limits of the competence of such bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations’.\footnote{Guideline 3.2.2 (Specification of the competence of treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations). For other examples of purely recommendatory guidelines see: 2.1.2 (Statement of reasons for reservations); 2.4.1 (Form of interpretative declarations); 2.4.5 (Communication of interpretative declarations); 2.6.9 (Statement of reasons for objections); 2.9.3, paragraph 2 (Recharacterization of an interpretative declaration); 2.9.5 (Form of approval, opposition and recharacterization); 2.9.6 (Statement of reasons for approval, opposition and recharacterization); 4.5.2, paragraph 2 (Reactions to a reservation considered invalid).} It has fully earned its place in a non-binding instrument like the Guide, whose function is to assist the practice (whether administrative, legislative, arbitral, or jurisdictional) without thwarting necessary evolutions, but in guiding them.

The Guide has sometimes been criticized for its length and lack of manageable. There is some truth in this, but adding new ambiguities to the existing ones would not have been of great help. Moreover, in such a technical and controversial topic, clear-cut solutions would have been hopeless. It is nevertheless to be hoped that in a majority of cases, the user will find in the Guide the answers to the questions he or she is confronted with. And it is for this reason that the commentaries form an integral part of
In a way, the guidelines are only the outline, the table of contents, of the Guide, the core of which is constituted by the commentaries.

This being said, even if the rules stated or proposed in the Guide should be followed in the absence of contrary special norms, none of them is peremptory by nature—which means that all are derogable. In other words, states and international organizations are perfectly welcome to provide for a special and derogatory regime for reservations formulated *vis-à-vis* a given instrument. This possibility is too often underestimated by the drafters of international conventions, as well as by those criticizing the Vienna regime of reservations, including the human rights bodies and activists.

Before leaving the topic of the (non-)binding force of the Guide to Practice, it is in order to recall that two ‘recommendations’ have been adopted together with the Guide: ‘Conclusions on the Reservations Dialogue’ on the one hand, and a ‘Recommendation of the Commission on Mechanisms of Assistance in Relation to Reservations to Treaties’. As recalled above, the proposals of the Special Rapporteur on these two sub-topics, which were made on an equal footing, were treated differently by the Commission.

Concerning the text on the ‘reservations dialogue’, it must be noted that there exists no definition of this notion which is not a term of art. I used it first in my eighth report to designate a process followed by states (mainly European at the time) by which states ‘inform the reserving State of the reasons why they think the reservation should be withdrawn, clarified or modified. Such communications may be true objections, but often they merely open a dialogue that could lead to an objection but could also result in the modification or withdrawal of the reservation’. As I tried to explain during the 2011 session, this expression alludes to the fact that, independently of the substantive and procedural rules applicable to reservations, contracting states and contracting international organizations could, and in many cases did, engage in an informal dialogue concerning the permissibility, scope, and meaning of reservations or objections to reservations formulated by a contracting state or a

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81 See *supra* note 3 and the text accompanying it.

82 In this respect, I have always regretted that some of the guidelines adopted by the Commission include the phrase ‘unless the treaty otherwise provides’ (or an equivalent formula) see: Guidelines 2.1.6 (Procedure for communication of reservations), 2.3 (Late formulation of reservations), 2.3.1 (Acceptance of the late formulation of a reservation), 2.4.8 (Modification of an interpretative declaration), 2.5.1 (Withdrawal of reservations), 2.5.8 (Effective date of withdrawal of a reservation), 2.6.12 (Time period for formulating objections), 2.7.1 (Withdrawal of objections to reservations), 2.7.5 (Effective date of withdrawal of an objection), 2.7.7 (Partial withdrawal of an objection), 2.8.2 (Tacit acceptance of reservations), 2.8.8 (Acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization), 3.1 (Permissible reservations), 3.5 (Permissibility of an interpretative declaration), 4.1.1 (Establishment of a reservation expressly authorized by a treaty): *all* the directives in the Guide to Practice as well as *all* the rules relating to reservations in the Vienna Convention are derogable. It is true that the Vienna Conventions themselves have given a bad example in this respect: see Arts 19 (a) and (b); 20 (1), 20 (3), 20 (4), 20 (5), 22 (1), 22 (2), 22 (3).

83 For more developments on this mechanism see Wood, this issue.


contracting organization. Such a dialogue, which can take place before as well as after a reservation was formulated, can take many forms and employ a wide variety of methods. As I stressed, the reservations dialogue had the advantages of preventing positions from becoming fixed, allowing the author of the reservation to explain its reasons, and facilitating better understanding among the parties concerned. The Commission was convinced and decided to attach, as an Annex to the Guide, the text of ‘Conclusions’ on the subject, ending up with a recommendation asking the General Assembly to ‘call upon States and international organizations, as well as monitoring bodies, to initiate and pursue such a reservations dialogue in a pragmatic and transparent manner’.

Although partly followed, my proposition to adopt another resolution, this time conceived as a recommendation to the General Assembly concerning technical assistance and assistance in the settlement of disputes concerning reservations, was less successful. The recommendation is finally more ambiguous than I would have wished in respect of the settlement of disputes and, instead of being included in the Guide itself, it is lost in the Report of the Commission where it has neither a clear status nor any visibility. The idea is that the General Assembly:

1. Consider establishing a reservations assistance mechanism, which could take the form described in the annex to this recommendation;
2. Consider establishing within its Sixth Committee an ‘observatory’ on reservations to treaties, and also recommend that States consider establishing similar ‘observatories’ at the regional and subregional levels.

2 The Main Issues – Solutions and Deadlocks

The first report of the Special Rapporteur had offered a ‘Brief Inventory of the Problems of the Topic’; it was, indeed, anything but brief; nor was it comprehensive, as further discussions have shown. But it remains a good starting point to evaluate the difficulties of the topic. Some are general in nature, others are more specific – not much easier to solve however. Going into all these difficulties would go far beyond the scope of the present article. But it can be noted that many aspects which seem secondary in an overall perspective are sources of difficulties in the day-to-day practice of legal divisions of ministries of Foreign Affairs or

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86 See ILC Report (2011), supra note 73, at 14–15, para. 66; see also: 17th Report, supra note 84, at paras 2–68 and the discussion within the ILC reported in the Provisional Summary Record of the 3099th meeting, 6 July 2011, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.3099.

87 See ibid.

88 Guide to Practice, supra note 1, at 602. Note that once again, the Commission refused – for obscure reasons – to adopt a resolution of its own and only adopted ‘Conclusions’ which it recommended the GA to follow up. This shyness is regrettable: nothing stops the ILC from directing recommendations directly to states and international organizations.

89 ILC Report (2011), supra note 73, at 18–19, para. 73.

90 The Annex to this recommendation briefly exposes some principles which could inspire the creation of the assistance mechanism.

91 1st Report, supra note 18, at 141–150, paras 91–149.
international organizations, and give serious problems to practitioners, whether
they are advocates or judges. The Guide to Practice’s ambition is to help them solve
these problems.

Besides a general Introduction explaining its object and scope, the Guide to Practice
on Reservations to Treaties is comprised of five different parts:

- Part 1 is devoted to ‘Definitions’ of reservations and interpretative declarations
  (including conditional interpretative declarations) and attempts to distinguish
  both from other unilateral statements, including from ‘alternatives’ to reserva-
  tions and interpretative declarations;
- Part 2 describes the ‘Procedure’ applicable to the formulation of reservations
  and interpretative declarations, their withdrawal, acceptances, and
  objections to reservations (and equivalent reactions to interpretative decla-
  rations), including the difficult issues raised by the late formulation of
  reservations;
- Part 3 focuses on the permissibility of reservations (of the reactions to reserva-
  tions and of interpretative declarations), that is mainly on a clarification of the
  criteria set out in Article 19 of the Vienna Conventions, their assessment, and
  the consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation;
- Part 4 probably raises the most difficult issues; it deals with the ‘Legal effects
  of reservations and interpretative declarations’, by distinguishing between ‘estab-
  lished’ valid reservations on the one hand and invalid reservations;
- finally, Part 5 introduces the rules applicable to ‘Reservations, acceptances of
  reservations, objections to reservations, and interpretative declarations in cases of
  succession of States’.

Each of these rubrics has raised unequally difficult issues. But it is worth noting that,
if the ILC has promoted a single legal regime for all kind of reservations, this was
possible only after it had taken a clear position on the necessary unity of the Vienna
regime.

92 Each Part is divided into Sections, then into guidelines, which are numbered accordingly. Thus guide-
line 3.3.1 (Irrelevance of distinction among the grounds for non-permissibility) is part of Section 3.3
(Consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation), itself included in Part 3 (Permissibility of res-
ervations and interpretative declarations). In rare cases, guidelines are given four numbers (those of the
series 3.1.5 (Incompatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty), namely from
guideline 3.1.5.1 to guideline 3.1.5.7).
93 Given the highly technical content of this Part, it is not further discussed in this general article.
94 With the sole exceptions of particular rules concerning reservations to treaties which must be applied in
their entirety (4.1.2 (Establishment of a reservation to a treaty which has to be applied in its entirety)) or
of a constituent instrument of an international organization (2.8.8 (Acceptance of a reservation to the
constituent instrument of an international organization); 2.8.9 (Organ competent to accept a reserva-
tion to a constituent instrument); 2.8.10 (Modalities of the acceptance of a reservation to a constituent
instrument); 2.8.11 (Acceptance of a reservation to a constituent instrument that has not yet entered
into force); 2.8.12 (Reaction by a member of an international organization to a reservation to its constit-
uent instrument); 4.1.3 (Establishment of a reservation to a constituent instrument of an international
organization)).
A The Preliminary Issue: Unity or Diversity?

As explained above, at the very beginning of the study I deemed it indispensable to
discuss a preliminary general issue: are the rules applicable to reservations to trea-
ties, whether codified in Articles 19 to 23 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions,
or customary, applicable to all treaties, whatever their object? Although the question
could be asked for several kinds of treaties, it is raised with particular insistence in
respect to human rights treaties. Since the answer to this question conditioned the
drafting of several parts of the future Guide to Practice, it was dealt with in the second
report on reservations to treaties.95

In a large part, the issue is artificial, in that even the ‘hardest’ rules contained
in the Vienna Conventions are residuary in nature; none is imperative or peremp-
tory.96 The Vienna regime merely supplements the will of the parties, which can
always derogate to them by introducing in their treaty special provisions concern-
ing reservations if they consider that the Vienna regime is inappropriate. And it
could happen that a general practice of promoting special rules on reservations
concerning certain types of treaties could be at the origin of a new customary
regime, specific to those treaties. But, interestingly, this has not happened: no
category of treaties – and certainly not human rights treaties – has generated a
particular practice concerning reservations clauses. This is probably a sign that
the negotiators of the treaties at least find the Vienna regime satisfactory and
suitable.

And the issue was discussed at some length during the elaboration of the Vienna
Conventions. However, after some rather heated exchanges,97 the Commission:

decided that there were insufficient reasons for making a distinction between different kinds
of multilateral treaties other than to exempt from the general rule those concluded between a
small number of States for which the unanimity rule is retained.98

And indeed these treaties which have to be applied in their entirety and the con-
stituent instruments of international organizations are the only kinds of treaties for
which the Vienna Conventions contain partially derogatory rules.99

Moreover, concerning human rights treaties more specifically,100 it can be recalled
that the flexible regime adopted at Vienna has its (at least immediate) origin in
the 1951 Advisory Opinion of the ICJ which was precisely given in relation to the

95 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 67–82, paras 164–252.
96 See supra note 81 and the accompanying text.
97 See, e.g.: Yrbk ILC (1951), II, at 3–4, paras 11–16; Yrbk ILC (1954), II, at 131–133; Yrbk ILC (1956) II, at
126–127, paras 92–98; Yrbk ILC (1962), II, at 178–181. See also: 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 57–59,
paras 99–111.
A/6309/Rev. 1, at 206, para. (14) of the commentary on draft Art. 16 (Formulation of reservations); see
also (almost word for word): Yrbk ILC (1962), II, at 181, para. 23 of the commentary on draft Art. 20.
99 Cf. Art. 20(2) (Treaties which have to be applied in their entirety) and (3) (Constituent instruments of
international organizations).
100 For a more exhaustive presentation of the problematic and of the substantive solutions proposed in this
respect see Ziemele and Liede, in this issue, at 1135.
fundamental and pioneering universal human rights instrument: the 1948 Genocide Convention. Moreover, not only did the now universal Vienna regime directly originate from considerations concerning first human rights instruments, but this set of rules (or the most important of them: the compatibility of the reservations with the object and purpose of the treaty) has also expressly been referred to in the reservations provisions of human rights treaties as well as in recommendations of human rights treaty bodies themselves.

This is justified: the Vienna regime is well balanced, flexible, and adaptable. It strikes the right balance between the need for universality and the preservation of the integrity of the treaty – a balance which is sought for all kinds of treaties and which inspired both the majority and the minority in the case concerning Reservations to the Genocide Convention. The traditional unanimity rule – according to which a state formulating a reservation could become a party to the treaty only if and when all other parties had accepted the reservation – would be extremely crippling in a world where nearly 200 states very different from one another can be concerned by a treaty. The new rule is well-tailored to the new conditions of international relations: it facilitates the participation in the treaty of all interested states while guaranteeing that the object and purpose of the treaty – that is its core content – will be safeguarded.

101 ‘The solution of these problems must be found in the special characteristics of the Genocide Convention. The origins and character of that Convention, the objects pursued by the General Assembly and the contracting parties, the relations which exist between the provisions of the Convention, inter se, and between those provisions and these objects, furnish elements of interpretation of the will of the General Assembly and the parties. The Convention was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitarian and civilizing purpose. It is indeed difficult to imagine a convention that might have this dual character to a greater degree, since its object on the one hand is to safeguard the very existence of certain human groups and on the other to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality. In such a convention the contracting States do not have any interests of their own; they merely have, one and all, a common interest, namely, the accomplishment of those high purposes which are the raison d’être of the convention. Consequently, in a convention of this type one cannot speak of individual advantages or disadvantages to States, or of the maintenance of a perfect contractual balance between rights and duties. The high ideals which inspired the Convention provide, by virtue of the common will of the parties, the foundation and measure of all its provisions’: Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at 23.

102 For more details see Pellet and Müller, supra note 47, at 531–533.

103 For the majority of the Court, ‘[t]he object and purpose of the Genocide Convention imply that it was the intention of the General Assembly and of the States which voted it that as many States as possible should participate. The complete exclusion from the Convention of one or more States would not only restrict the scope of its application, but would detract from the authority of the moral and humanitarian principles which are its basis’: Reservations to the Genocide Convention, supra note 22, at 24. The judges in the minority considered that ‘[i]t is ... not universality at any price that forms the first consideration. It is rather the acceptance of common obligations – keeping step with like-minded States – in order to attain a high objective for all humanity, that is of paramount importance. ... In the interests of the international community, it would be better to lose as a party to the Convention a State which insists in face of objections on a modification of the terms of the Convention, than to permit it to become a party against the wish of a State or States which have irrevocably and unconditionally accepted all the obligations of the Convention’: Joint dissenting opinion of Judges Guerrero, Sir Arnold McNair, Read and Hsu Mo, ibid., at 47. See also Dissenting opinion of Judge Alvarez, ibid., at 51 and 53.
And it is difficult to perceive why this would not cope with the 'special needs' of human rights treaties – unless one accepts the intellectual terrorism exercised by some human rights extremists. According to the ‘human rightist’ approach, human rights treaties would be characterized by three main traits which would impede the application of the Vienna regime on reservations:

- they would be essentially non-reciprocal;
- they would require full application since, by nature, they lend themselves to no reservation whatsoever;
- contrary to what happens for ‘ordinary treaties’ their integrity is guaranteed by special bodies.

The non-reciprocity objection, usual as it is, is simply nonsensical:

- human rights treaties are largely (but not entirely) non-reciprocal; but this is also true of treaties concluded in other fields like the protection of the environment or the maintenance of the peace, or for treaties providing uniform law;
- it is precisely by basing itself on this character that the ICJ sanctioned the flexible system by opposition to the previous rule of unanimity; and, in any case,
- the reciprocity element is not indispensable for the correct operation of the Vienna rules; any rule of law applies only when it is ... applicable, and the same is true for

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the reciprocity principle: if and when a valid reservation is made to a non-reciprocal provision, Article 21(1) (b) or (3) of the Vienna Convention simply does not operate for the accepting or the objecting party, as is made clear by guideline 4.2.5.110

Except for purely ideological reasons, there is no more ground for the allegation that by essence human rights treaties are not open to reservations. In its (most debatable) General Comment No. 24, the Human Rights Committee stated:

In an instrument which articulates very many civil and political rights, each of the many articles, and indeed their interplay, secures the objectives of the Covenant. The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken.111

Taken literally, this position would render invalid any general reservation bearing on any one of the rights protected by the Covenant. However, the Committee itself does not go that far and recognizes that reservations may usefully encourage a wider acceptance of the Covenant.112

It remains that reservations to general human rights treaties raise specific difficulties. But this is caused not by their human rights object but by their global character. This is why the ILC which, in a first move, had envisaged devoting a particular guideline to the specific issues concerning the determination of the object and purpose of 'general human rights treaties', realizing that there was no reason to individualize human rights treaties since the same considerations came into play for all treaties containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations, eventually adopted guideline 3.1.5.6,115 which attempts to strike a
particularly delicate balance between these different considerations by combining three elements:

- The interdependence of the rights and obligations;
- The importance that the provision to which the reservation relates has within the general tenor of the treaty; and
- The extent of the impact that the reservation has on the treaty.116

But, again, as the title of this guideline makes clear, these directives are not specific to reservations to human rights treaties; they apply to ‘reservations to treaties containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations’ in general.

Similarly, it is certainly desirable that ‘the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the Covenant ... be established objectively, by reference to legal principles’.117 But this holds true for all kinds of multilateral treaties, and is by no means limited to human rights treaties. Whereas the existence of monitoring bodies is certainly a peculiarity of human rights treaties, it is neither a necessary element of these instruments, nor an ‘exclusive’ peculiarity118 and indeed not an argument to modify the generally applicable reservations regime which bears upon the substantive principles to be applied by the competent authority to assess the validity of the reservation – whether a state, an international organization, a judge, or a monitoring body. The control of the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty by independent bodies constitutes a guarantee of a more objective assessment of this rather subjective test. Monitoring consequently constitutes clear progress in the application of the Vienna rules, and therefore contributes to ensuring the integrity of the treaty in question by permitting an objective assessment of the compatibility of a given reservation with the object and purpose of the treaty – whether a human rights treaty or not.119

After lengthy and difficult discussions between its members, between the ILC and the human rights bodies, and within the Sixth Committee, the Commission’s conclusion is unambiguous: the Vienna regime of reservations to treaties, as completed and specified in the Guide to Practice, is unitary and applies to all kind of reservations to all

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116 See guideline 3.1.5.6.
117 General Comment No. 24, supra note 44, at 124, para. 18.
118 Disarmament or environment treaties also quite often create other kinds of monitoring bodies although they operate differently.
119 See guideline 3.2.1 concerning the ‘[c]ompetence of the treaty monitoring bodies to assess the permissibility of reservations’ and its commentary. This guideline originates in paras 5 and 8 of the Preliminary Conclusions of the Commission adopted in 1997. At the time, these provisions were extremely controversial and gave rise to passionate debate: see, e.g.: Report of the ILC on the Work of its 48th Session, Yrbk ILC (1996), II(2), at 82, paras 126–131 and Report of the ILC on the Work of its 49th Session, supra note 50, at 48–50, paras 78–79. Following the lengthy discussions between the ILC and the human rights bodies, Section 3.2 of the Guide on the ‘Assessment of the Permissibility of Reservations’ was adopted in 2009 with much less reluctance than could have been expected in view of the previous debates on this matter: see 2nd Report, supra note 13, at 70–82, paras 179–252 and ILC, Summary Records of the Meetings of the 48th Session, Yrbk ILC (1996), I at 200–202, paras 26–47; also and in particular Summary Records of the Meetings of the 49th Session, Yrbk ILC (1997), I, at 179–212.
kind of treaties. In so deciding, the 2011 Commission confirmed the sensible solution adopted by the Commission in the 1960s.

B Part 1 – Definitions

Part 1 may look the least problematic since the three Vienna Conventions give a similar definition of reservations. However, it is an important topic since the application (or not) of the reservations regime depends upon it – and the ILC devoted quite a long time to the related issues.

The main point probably was to make the distinction between reservations on the one hand and interpretative declarations on the other as ‘operational’ as possible. It was all the more important that the Vienna Conventions do not mention the latter – a quite noticeable lacuna in the Conventions, which the Guide to Practice attempts to fill as far as possible, not only by giving a definition and tools for distinguishing interpretative declarations from reservations, but also by defining the full legal regime of the former.

One of the major difficulties was the fate to be reserved to the ‘conditional interpretative declarations’ defined in guideline 1.4. There is no doubt that such unilateral statements do not correspond to the definition of reservations since they do not purport ‘to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty’. Nevertheless, by formulating such a declaration, states commit themselves only conditionally, just as they do when they formulate reservations. Given the dissimilarity in the definitions, I had systematically proposed draft guidelines dealing with the legal regime of these specific interpretation declarations. However, it

120 With the only and limited exceptions provided for in Art. 20(2) and (3) of the Vienna Convention.


122 See guidelines 1.2 (Definition of interpretative declarations), 1.2.1 (Interpretative declarations formulated jointly), 1.3 (Distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations), 1.3.1 (Method of determining the distinction between reservations and interpretative declarations).

123 Each Part of the Guide includes sections on the rules applicable to interpretative declarations.

124 ‘1. A conditional interpretative declaration is a unilateral statement formulated by a State or an international organization when signing, ratifying, formally confirming, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, or by a State when making a notification of succession to a treaty, whereby the State or international organization subjects its consent to be bound by the treaty to a specific interpretation of the treaty or of certain provisions thereof.’

125 Cf. Art. 2(1)(d) of the 1969 Vienna Convention (and guideline 1.1 (1)).

rather quickly appeared that, in spite of the variance in the definition, conditional interpretative declarations ‘behave’ exactly as reservations; this is why, in 2001, the Commission decided that ‘[s]hould this assimilation be confirmed in regard to the effects of reservations and of conditional interpretative declarations respectively, the Commission is considering the possibility of not including in its draft Guide to Practice guidelines specifically relating to conditional interpretative declarations’,\(^{127}\)

It was only in 2010, when it had become clear that these declarations followed the same legal regime as reservations,\(^{128}\) that the Commission dropped all the draft guidelines already adopted in this respect and adopted paragraph 2 of guideline 1.4, according to which ‘[c]onditional interpretative declarations are subject to the rules applicable to reservations’.

Concerning the definition of reservations itself, three main points can be made.

First, I had – and from the very beginning of the research – deliberately envisaged clearly distinguishing between the definition of reservations and the issue of their validity. Going even further, I was – and am still – convinced that you can decide whether a reservation is valid or not only if you define the controversial statement as a reservation; in other terms, the definition must cover valid as well as invalid reservations. ‘It is only once a particular instrument has been defined as a reservation (or an interpretative declaration, either simple or conditional) that one can decide whether it is valid, evaluate its legal scope and determine its effect. However, this validity and these effects are not otherwise affected by the definition, which requires only that the relevant rules be applied.’\(^{129}\) I must say that, although I considered this point to be self-evident, I had to battle hard against several colleagues who had difficulty in accepting this, for me, elementary, reasoning.\(^{130}\)

It is true – and this is the second issue – that the Vienna definition itself is confusing, since it includes a temporal element which comes closer to a condition for its admissibility than to a definitional component. Nevertheless it has been included in the definition of reservations given in the Vienna Conventions; and this is why I hesitated for a long time on the position to be adopted for confronting the phenomenon of ‘late reservations’. I concede that, \textit{a priori}, they do not come within the meaning of ‘reservation’ as defined in the Convention. On the other hand, this is a very formal view and it is logical (and, I would think, easily acceptable) to consider the time factor\(^{131}\) as a condition of validity of a reservation. But this approach does not solve the problem: if the Vienna definition were to be taken literally, all reservations formulated late ought to be considered as invalid and without any effect whatsoever. This might be so in abstract law, but not in real life where examples can easily be found of reservations formulated late and producing all the consequences attached


\(^{129}\) See Guide to Practice, supra note 1, at para. 2 of the commentary to guideline 1.8.


\(^{131}\) For a broader presentation of the relations between reservations and time see Müller, in this issue.
to a valid reservation with the approval of all the parties to the treaty. This is why I have advocated prudent recognition of this fact of the legal life and maintained it, in spite of strong opposition from within and outside the ILC. Finally, the Commission has endorsed – but not in Part 1 on definitions – a series of guidelines on the ‘late formulation of reservations’, which reintroduce the unanimity principle for these reservations. This reasonable solution coincides with the dominant practice and integrally preserves the consent principle. It may not be entirely orthodox, but ‘ayatollah’s law’ leads to deadlocks ...

The third troubling issue concerning reservations is of the same nature, but less difficult – and it has given rise to fewer controversies. It bears upon ‘across-the-board’ or ‘transversal’ reservations, that is ‘reservations which purport to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of a treaty, or of the treaty as a whole with respect to certain specific aspects, in their application to the State or to the international organization which formulates the reservation’. This kind of statement is not mentioned in the Vienna definition; however, ‘[t]he abundance and coherence of the practice of across-the-board reservations (which are not always imprecise and general reservations) and the absence of objections in principle to this type of reservations indicate a practical need that it would be absurd to challenge in the name of abstract legal logic’.

As for the rest, Part 1 of the Guide to Practice brings various clarifications to the definitions of reservations and interpretative declarations, the method of discriminating between the two, other unilateral statements, and various alternatives to reservations
and interpretative declarations. It also deals with “Reservations” to bilateral treaties; the fact that the word ‘reservations’ is, unusually, written between inverted commas is telling: such statements, while currently called ‘reservations’, do not constitute reservations within the meaning of the Guide; such a statement ‘appears to be a proposal to amend the treaty in question or an offer to renegotiate it’; if accepted, it ‘becomes an amendment to the treaty’.

C Part 2 – Procedure

Of all five parts, part 2 raised the least controversial issues except for the question of the late formulation of reservations. The guidelines comprising it were, however, carefully drafted and commented on, given the considerable practical importance of the issues concerned. There is not much to be said on sections 2.1 (Form and notification of reservations), 2.2 (Confirmation of reservations), or 2.4 (Procedure for interpretative declarations). Section 2.5 gives useful clarifications on the ‘Withdrawal and modification of reservations and interpretative declarations’ on which the Vienna Conventions are largely mute. Besides cautiously encouraging periodical review of the usefulness of reservations, guidelines 2.5.7 to 2.5.11 elucidate the effects of the withdrawal of a reservation, whether full or partial, and the date on which such effects arise. Section 2.9 deals with the Formulation of reactions to interpretative declarations.

More interesting, at least from an academic perspective, are sections 2.6 and 2.7 on objections to reservations and their withdrawal or modification and 2.8 on the Formulation of acceptances of reservations.

139 On these two last points the Special Rapporteur’s 5th Report, supra note 121, at 159–180, paras 66–213) was more detailed than the commentaries of the Commission on guidelines 1.5 to 1.5.3 (Unilateral statements other than reservations and interpretative declarations) and 1.7 to 1.7.2 (Alternative to reservations and interpretative declarations).
140 Cf. guideline 1.6.
141 Guide to Practice, supra note 1, Commentary on guideline 1.6, at para. 17.
142 Ibid., at para. 20.
143 However, my colleagues could get extremely excited by the most fundamental question of knowing whether or not the communication of a reservation could be made by electronic mail or facsimile ... This interesting (?) issue kept the Commission and its Drafting Committee busy for hours; see Yrbk ILC (2002), I, at 150, para. 23, at 152, paras 42–43; at 153, para. 4; and the discussion during the 59th session of the ILC (2007), in Provisional Summary Record of the 2917th meeting, 10 May 2007, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2917, at 6–7 and 12; also Provisional Summary Record of the 2918th meeting, 11 May 2007, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2918, at 3, 5, 8; and Provisional Summary Record of the 2919th meeting, 12 May 2007, Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2919, at 6. See guideline 2.1.6 (3).
144 See, however, Arts 22(1) and 23(4), the texts of which are reproduced respectively in guidelines 2.5.1 and 2.5.2.
145 Guideline 2.5.3.
146 Note the care taken by the ILC to differentiate between the terminology applicable to those reactions and that which is usual concerning reactions to reservations: ‘approval’ (approbation) instead of ‘acceptance’ (acceptation); ‘opposition’ (opposition) instead of ‘objection’ (objection); to this must be added the specific operation of ‘recharacterization’ (requalification) of an interpretative declaration, by which the reacting state purports to treat the declaration as a reservation (guideline 2.9.3).
Guideline 2.6.1 gives a definition of objections to reservations, which is missing in the Vienna Conventions.\textsuperscript{149} This definition is, so to speak, the ‘negative’ carbon copy of that of reservations themselves, in that it characterizes an objection – exactly as guideline 1.1 copied from the Vienna Conventions does for reservations – not by its effects by but its ‘purported’ effects.\textsuperscript{150} Moreover, the most important guideline, 2.6.2, establishes the right of states and international organizations\textsuperscript{151} to formulate an objection ‘irrespective of the permissibility of the reservation’. This is a prominent element of the essentially consensual nature of the law of reservations: states have a right to formulate reservations; the other parties (or future possible parties) have their own right not to be bound to partners which do not accept the negotiated text in its entirety – whatever the reasons,\textsuperscript{152} including by opposing the entry into force of the treaty as between the objecting state and the author of the reservation.\textsuperscript{153}

Nothing special deserves to be discussed in respect of the formulation of acceptances of reservations.\textsuperscript{154} The Guide to Practice of course maintains the principle set out in Article 20(5) of the Vienna Conventions, according to which, unless the treaty otherwise provides, an acceptance results from 12 months’ silence kept by another state after the notification of the reservation.\textsuperscript{155} The most noticeable clarification resulting from Section 2.8 is given by guideline 2.8.13, according to which ‘[t]he acceptance of a reservation cannot be withdrawn or amended’.\textsuperscript{156}

D Part 3 – Permissibility of Reservations and Interpretative Declarations

The main difficulties are concentrated in Parts 3 and 4 – one of them being specific to the English version, since English-speaking ILC members and the UK delegation in

\textsuperscript{149} “‘Objection’ means a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State or an international organization in response to a reservation formulated by another State or international organization, whereby the former State or organization purports to preclude the reservation from having its intended effects or otherwise opposes the reservation.’

\textsuperscript{150} See Guide to Practice, supra note 1, the commentary on guideline 2.6.1, at paras 1 and 2; see also para. 25. However, the definition of objections – contrary to that of reservations – does not include any mention of the time at which an objection must be made (but see guidelines 2.6.12 (Time period for formulating objections) and 2.6.13 (Objections formulated late)).

\textsuperscript{151} Guideline 2.6.3 specifies that ‘[a]n objection to a reservation may be formulated by: (i) any contracting State or contracting organization; and (ii) any State or international organization that is entitled to become a party to the treaty, in which case the objection does not produce any legal effect until the State or international organization has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty’: this last expression reproduces the formula in Art. 23(1) of the Vienna Conventions concerning the notification of reservations, express acceptances and objections and, as the ILC rightly notes, ‘[s]uch a notification has meaning only if these other States and international organizations can in fact react to the reservation by way of an express acceptance or an objection’ (Guide to Practice, supra note 1, at para. 4 of the commentary on the guideline 2.6.3). In spite of this common sense remark, para. (ii) was strongly opposed by several members of the ILC.

\textsuperscript{152} Guideline 2.6.9 encourages states and international organizations to state the reasons why they formulate objections; but this is by no means a legally binding obligation.

\textsuperscript{153} See guideline 2.6.6.

\textsuperscript{154} Note however, the five guidelines devoted to the procedure of acceptance of a reservation to the constituent instrument of an international organization (guidelines 2.8.8 to 2.8.12).

\textsuperscript{155} See guidelines 2.8.1 and 2.8.2.

\textsuperscript{156} Guidelines 2.8.7 and 2.8.11 echo guideline 2.8.13 by stating that, once obtained, unanimous acceptances, when required, are final.
the Sixth Committee obstinately opposed the use of the word ‘validity’ to designate the fact that a reservation could produce its purported effects.157 Hence the use of the word ‘permissibility’ in the title of Part 3 of the Guide to Practice (corresponding to validité substantielle in the French text)158 – an expression which I disapprove of, since it seems to support the ‘permissibility school’ (by opposition to the ‘opposability school’), while the Commission and the Special Rapporteur have tried to keep away from any ready-made position.159

Part 3 of the Guide starts with guideline 3.1 which simply reproduces Article 19 of the 1986 Vienna Convention, so seminal in the law of reservations.160 This induced the Commission to try to specify as far as possible the impenetrable notion of ‘object and purpose’ which is at the heart of any assessment of the permissibility of reservations. To this end, guideline 3.1.4 gives a general idea of the meaning of the expression,161 and guideline 3.1.5.1 suggests a method of determining the object and purpose of the treaty.162 These crucial provisions are completed by guidelines 3.1.5.2 to 3.1.5.7 which give a series of examples bearing upon the most usual difficulties met in making this determination:163

- vague or general reservations (guideline 3.1.5.2),
- reservations to a provision reflecting a customary rule (guideline 3.1.5.3);
- reservations to provisions concerning rights from which no derogation is permissible under any circumstances (guideline 3.1.5.4);
- reservations relating to internal law (including specific rules of an international organization) (guideline 3.1.5.5);
- reservations to treaties containing numerous interdependent rights and obligations (guideline 3.1.5.6); and
- reservations to treaty provisions concerning dispute settlement or the monitoring of the implementation of the treaty (guideline 3.1.5.7).

157 See 10th Report, supra note 166, at paras 4–5. For other positions on this terminological issue see 11th Report, supra note 61, at paras 18–23.

158 I have persuaded my English speaking colleagues (and apparently the UK Government) to accept the use of the terms ‘valid’ and ‘validity’ in Part 4 of the Guide in order to refer to the conformity of a reservation to the conditions of form and substance imposed by the law of reservations.

159 This said, I must admit that, while I was entirely in a neutral frame of mind when I was designated as the Special Rapporteur on the topic, I now tend to tip in favour of the ‘permissibility’ way of thinking, which I think reasonably reconciles Arts 19 and 20 of the Vienna Conventions and is more realistic and reasonable than the ‘hyper-sovereignist’ reasoning inspiring the advocates of the opposability school.


161 Guideline 3.1.5: ‘[a] reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty if it affects an essential element of the treaty that is necessary to its general tenor, in such a way that the reservation impairs the raison d’être of the treaty’.

162 Guideline 3.1.5.1: ‘[t]he object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith, taking account of the terms of the treaty in their context, in particular the title and the preamble of the treaty. Recourse may also be had to the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where appropriate, the subsequent practice of the parties.’

163 More widely, these guidelines concern the most controversial issues concerning the permissibility of reservations and are not all related to the object and purpose of the treaty stricte sensu.
This article is not the place to comment on each of these points, which are the object of abundant commentaries. However, two questions, not expressly dealt with in the guidelines, deserve some explanations:

– the problems linked to the so-called ‘sharia reservation’; and
– those concerning reservations on provisions reflecting a peremptory norm (*jus cogens*).

I was prepared to meet huge difficulties in respect to the former, but I did not expect tricky discussions on the latter. The religious war did not come where it was anticipated: the exact opposite happened.

I must admit that, when reflecting upon my topic, I was apprehensive of the reactions Islamic states within the Sixth Committee or my Moslem colleagues could have regarding the ‘sharia reservation’, which I would have found it dishonest not to discuss. At the same time, I was (and still am) sincerely convinced that the issue was by no means the sharia by itself but the unacceptable specificities of certain reservations based on the sharia, specificities which can be found also in other reservations having no relation with the sharia or with Islam. Contrary to my fears, this view was endorsed without any difficulty by the Commission and, to my knowledge, did not lead to protests in the Sixth Committee. As the ILC notes in its commentary on guideline 2.1.5.2 in relation to a most objected to reservation:

> the problem lies not in the fact that Mauritania is invoking a law of religious origin which it applies, [footnote omitted] but, rather that, as Denmark noted, ‘the general reservations with reference to the provisions of Islamic law are of unlimited scope and undefined character’ [*Multilateral Treaties ..., chap. IV.8.*].

The reason why such reservations are not admissible has nothing to do with their religious origin: it lies in the fact that their vagueness makes it impossible ‘to assess [their] compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty’ and, therefore, deprives the other parties of their right to react (by accepting or objecting to the reservation) with full knowledge of their meaning and scope. The problems raised by reservations based on national law are similar: ‘a reservation is not invalid solely because it aims to preserve the integrity of specific rules of internal law’; but it can be inadmissible either because the author of the reservation invokes its domestic law ‘without identifying the provisions in question or specifying whether they are to be found in its constitution or its civil or criminal code’.

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165 I.e., the reservation by which Mauritania approved the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women ‘in each and every one of its parts which are not contrary to Islamic sharia’ (*Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General*, available at: [http://treaties.un.org/](http://treaties.un.org/); chap. IV.8.).
166 Guide to Practice, *supra* note 1, commentary to guideline 3.5.2, at para. 7.
167 Guideline 3.1.5.2.
168 See Guide to Practice, *supra* note 1, commentary to guideline 3.5.1.2, at para. 3.
As for the admissibility of reservations to treaty provisions reflecting a norm of *jus cogens*, I had, with hesitation,\textsuperscript{171} proposed a draft guideline resting on a different assumption from the guideline relating to reservations to provisions reflecting a customary rule: draft guideline 3.1.9 accepted that the peremptory nature of the norms set out in the provision rendered the reservation impermissible.\textsuperscript{172} However, this proposal met with serious objections during the debates in the Drafting Committee where it gave rise to a most passionate debate reflecting the sensitivity of my colleagues on all matters pertaining to *jus cogens*; this very lengthy discussion provisionally ended with a meaningless ‘compromise solution’\textsuperscript{173} which was abandoned in 2011 in favour of another unfortunate compromise:

- no guideline would be adopted in Part 3 of the Guide on reservations to a provision reflecting a peremptory norm;
- the pros and cons for both views would be explained in the commentary on guideline 3.1.5.3 (Reservations to a provision reflecting a customary rule); however,
- by way of conclusion to this commentary it would be mentioned that the Commission ‘is of the view that the principle stated in guideline 3.1.5.3 applies to reservations to treaty provisions reflecting a customary peremptory norm’,\textsuperscript{174} and
- guideline 4.4.3 (Absence of effect on a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*)) would read as follows:

1. A reservation to a treaty provision which reflects a peremptory norm of general international law (*jus cogens*) does not affect the binding nature of that norm, which shall continue to apply as such between the reserving State or organization and other States or international organizations.
2. A reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law.\textsuperscript{175}

This formulation implicitly recognizes that reservations to provisions reflecting a peremptory norm are subject to the same rules as reservations to provisions which reflect customary rules. It would have been simpler and franker to say it expressly, but some measure of hypocrisy sometimes makes consensus easier ...

\textsuperscript{171} See 10th Report, supra note 166, at paras 131–137.

\textsuperscript{172} Draft guideline 3.1.9 (Reservations to provisions setting forth a rule of *jus cogens*): ‘[a] State or an international organization may not formulate a reservation to a treaty provision which sets forth a peremptory norm of general international law’: 10th Report, supra note 166, at para. 146.

\textsuperscript{173} Guideline 3.1.9 as adopted by the Drafting Committee and endorsed by the Commission in 2007 provided as follows: ‘[r]eservations contrary to a rule of *jus cogens* – A reservation cannot exclude or modify the legal effect of a treaty in a manner contrary to a peremptory norm of general international law’: Report of the ILC on the Work of its 59th session, Official Records of the GA, 62nd Session, Supplement No. 10, Doc. A/62/10, at para. 47); for an hopeless justification see the Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, Mr Chusei Yamada, 4 May 2007, at 6.

\textsuperscript{174} Guide to Practice, supra note 1, commentary to guideline 3.5.1.3, para. (22). In this same commentary, the Commission notes that it ‘considers that States and international organizations should refrain from formulating such reservations and, when they deem it indispensable, should instead formulate reservations to the provisions concerning the treaty regime governing the rules in question’.

\textsuperscript{175} Para. 2 of guideline 4.4.3 reproduces the incongruous text of the 2007 guideline 3.1.9.
The other sections of Part 3 of the Guide to Practice are devoted to the assessment of permisibility of reservations (3.2), the consequences of the non-permissibility of a reservation (3.3) – a somehow misleading title, in that the main consequences are detailed in Part 4176 – the permisibility of reactions to reservations (on which the Commission had little to say since it considered that ‘[a]cceptance of a reservation is not subject to any condition of permisibility’177 and that only the permisibility of objections with ‘intermediate effects’ was subject to limitations.178 According to the general scheme of the various parts of the Guide, Part 3 ends with two sections on the permisibility of an interpretative declaration (3.5) and on reactions to such declaration (3.6).

E Part 4 – Legal Effect of Reservations and Interpretative Declarations

Article 21 of the Vienna Conventions deals with the ‘Legal effects of reservations and objections to reservations’.179 But, in reality, it says little on these effects, on which it sheds little light, and nothing on the effects of an invalid reservation.

In effect, as results from the first phrase of paragraph 1 of Article 21, it is limited to the legal effects of reservations ‘established with regard to another party in accordance with articles 19, 20 and 23’. Although some members of the ILC rather vigorously opposed sanctioning the concept of ‘established reservations’ in order not to create a new category of reservations,180 the Commission considered it indispensable to clarify this notion from the outset: this is done in Section 4.1 (guidelines 4.1 to 4.1.3). The general idea is that three conditions must be met:

(i) it must be formulated in accordance with the required form and procedure;
(ii) it must be permissible;181 and
(iii) it must be accepted by the required number of contracting states or international organizations.182

176 The three guidelines of this part respectively concern the irrelevance of the distinction between the grounds for non-permissibility (3.3.1), the position that the non-permissibility of reservation does not engage the international responsibility of its author (3.3.2), and the absence of effect of individual acceptance of a reservation on the permisibility of the reservation (3.3.3).

177 Guideline 3.4.1.

178 Guideline 3.4.2 (Permissibility of an objection to a reservation): ‘[a]n objection to a reservation by which a State or an international organization purports to exclude in its relations with the author of the reservation the application of provisions of the treaty to which the reservation does not relate is only permissible if: (1) the provisions thus excluded have a sufficient link with the provisions to which the reservation relates; and (2) the objection would not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty in the relations between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection’.

179 See Müller’s commentary on this provision in Corten and Klein (eds), supra note 159, at 538–567.


181 The combination of these two first conditions makes the reservation ‘valid’.

182 One at least in the basic case (Art. 20(4) of the Vienna Conventions and guideline 4.1); none when the reservation has been expressly authorized by the treaty (Art. 20(1) and guideline 4.1.2); all contracting states or international organizations if the treaty has to be applied in its entirety (Art. 20(2) and guideline 4.1.3) and by the competent organ of the organization if the treaty is a constituent instrument of an international organization (Art. 20(3) and see guideline 4.1.3).
When a reservation is thus established, it produces the effects described in section 4.2:

– its author becomes a contracting state or organization to the treaty (guideline 4.2.1) and a party if and when the treaty is in force\(^\text{183}\) (guideline 4.2.3);

– if the treaty is not yet in force, the author of the established reservation can be taken into account for the calculation of the number of states (or organizations) necessary for the entry into force (guideline 4.2.2); and

– it produces the effects purported by the reservation\(^\text{184}\) (see guideline 4.2.4).

Of course, these effects are partly paralysed when another state makes an objection to a valid reservation, as rather extensively developed in Section 4.3 of the Guide to Practice. The important point is the variations of the consequences of an objection, depending on the will of the objecting state. In this respect, without contradicting the Vienna Conventions, the Guide goes beyond their provisions, which envisage only two hypotheses: what is currently named objections with maximum effect (by which a state excludes the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the reserving state)\(^\text{185}\) or with ‘normal effect’.\(^\text{186}\) Guideline 4.3.7 for its part sanctions, although with caution, the existence of objections with intermediate effects,\(^\text{187}\) by which an objecting state purports to exclude the application of ‘a provision of the treaty to which the reservation does not relate, but which has a sufficient link with the provisions to which the reservation does relate’. However, ‘in order to restore what could be referred to as the “consensual balance” between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection,\(^\text{188}\) paragraph 2 of guideline 4.3.7 treats such an objection as a kind of “counter-reservation” to which the reserving State can make “counter-objections”’.\(^\text{189}\)

Indirectly guideline 4.3.8 (Right of the author of a valid reservation not to comply with the treaty without the benefit of its reservation) alludes to what is now usually called an objection with ‘super-maximum’ effect (at least purporting to produce such an effect) by stating:

\(^{183}\) As a reminder: ‘“contracting State” means a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty, whether or not the treaty has entered into force:’ 1969 Vienna Convention, Art. 2(1)(f); ‘“party” means a State which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force’: Art. 2(1)(g).

\(^{184}\) As a reminder too: a reservation is defined not by its effects but by its purported effects: see supra note 155 and the accompanying text.

\(^{185}\) See Vienna Conventions, Arts 20(4)(b) and 21(3) and guidelines 4.3.1 and 4.3.5. When an objection is made to a reservation to a treaty requiring unanimous acceptance, it of course precludes the entry into force of the treaty for the author of the reservation (guideline 4.3.4).

\(^{186}\) See Vienna Conventions, Art. 21(1) and guidelines 4.3 and 4.3.1 and the rather complex guideline 4.3.6. Contrary to a frequently alleged idea, a ‘simple’ objection does not amount to an acceptance: see Pellet and Müller, ‘Reservations to Treaties: An Objection to a Reservation is Definitely not an Acceptance’, in E. Cannizzaro (ed.), The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (in Honour of Giorgio Gaja) (2011), at 37, 37–59.

\(^{187}\) See supra note 176 and the accompanying text.

\(^{188}\) See supra note 1, commentary to guideline 4.3.7, at para. 10.

\(^{189}\) ‘2. The reserving State or international organization may, within a period of twelve months following the notification of an objection which has the effect referred to in paragraph 1, oppose the entry into force of the treaty between itself and the objecting State or organization. In the absence of such opposition, the treaty shall apply between the author of the reservation and the author of the objection to the extent provided by the reservation and the objection.’
The author of a valid reservation is not required to comply with the provisions of the treaty without the benefit of its reservation.

Thus, the ILC takes a clear-cut position – which was unanimously accepted – on the question of objections ‘whereby the author of the objection affirms that the treaty enters into force in its relations with the author of the reservation without the latter being able to benefit from its reservation’: they do not produce the effect purported by their author when the reservation is valid – such a consequence would be eminently contrary to the principle of consent.

But the question of the effects of objections is a different matter when they react to an invalid reservation. Section 4.5, which probably is the most innovative (since the Vienna Conventions are mute) and the most delicate portion of the Guide, sets out the consequences of an invalid reservation. The principle is that an invalid reservation ‘is null and void’, independently of the reactions of the other contracting states. But this only partially solves the question of the status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to the treaty. The ILC’s more complete answer is given in guideline 4.5.3, which deserves to be reproduced in full:

1. The status of the author of an invalid reservation in relation to a treaty depends on the intention expressed by the reserving State or international organization on whether it intends to be bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation or whether it considers that it is not bound by the treaty.
2. Unless the author of the invalid reservation has expressed a contrary intention or such an intention is otherwise established, it is considered a contracting State or a contracting organization without the benefit of the reservation.
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2, the author of the invalid reservation may express at any time its intention not to be bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation.
4. If a treaty monitoring body expresses the view that a reservation is invalid and the reserving State or international organization intends not to be bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, it should express its intention to that effect within a period of twelve months from the date at which the treaty monitoring body made its assessment.

Guideline 4.5.3 is the final outcome of a long and painful process, which, in fact, began with the ‘confrontational dialogue’ between the ILC and the human rights bodies following the adoption by the Human Rights Committee of its General Comment No. 24 and by the Commission of its Preliminary Conclusions on Reservations to Normative Multilateral Treaties Including Human Rights Treaties. The HRC had declared that:

The normal consequence of an unacceptable reservation is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party. Rather, such a reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for the reserving party without benefit of the reservation.

191 Guide to Practice, supra note 1, commentary to guideline 4.3.7, at para. 1.
192 Guideline 4.5.1.
193 Guideline 4.5.2.
194 See supra note 51 and the accompanying text. On the appreciation of the role of the monitoring bodies with respect to reservations, see Wood, in this issue.
195 General Comment No. 24, supra note 44, at 124, para. 18.
For its part, the Commission had concluded in 1997 that:

in the event of inadmissibility of a reservation, it is the reserving State that has the responsibility for taking action. This action may consist, for example, in the State’s either modifying its reservation so as to eliminate the inadmissibility, or withdrawing its reservation, or forgoing becoming a party to the treaty.196

Both texts left the way open for less drastic and general solutions and, in effect, guideline 4.5.3 as finally adopted is midway between the two extreme positions: the Commission has maintained that, in conformity with its initial view, it was in principle for the reserving state to express its intention. On the other hand, it has taken an important step towards the position of the human rights bodies in that it accepts the principle of a (rebuttable) presumption in favour of the severability of the reservation (that is of the super-maximum effect of the reservation). However, several remarks can be made:

– this middle way solution could only be adopted after years of discussions, during which the points of view slowly moved closer together;

– however, this move is more true concerning the members of the ILC and of the human rights bodies; as for the states, the 2010 debate in the Sixth Committee revealed quite rigidly stubborn and rather discouraging positions;197

– the draft guideline adopted that year by the Commission was certainly less unsatisfactory than the final text of guideline 4.5.3; it read thus:

When an invalid reservation has been formulated, the reserving State or the reserving international organization is considered a contracting State or a contracting organization or, as the case may be, a party to the treaty without the benefit of the reservation, unless a contrary intention of the said State or organization can be identified.

The intention of the author of the reservation shall be identified by taking into consideration all factors that may be relevant to that end, including:

• The wording of the reservation
• Statements made by the author of the reservation when negotiating, signing or ratifying the treaty, or otherwise expressing its consent to be bound by the treaty
• Subsequent conduct of the author of the reservation
• Reactions of other contracting States and contracting organizations
• The provision or provisions to which the reservation relates. The object and purpose of the treaty.198

– the proposal had the merits to opt for a clear presumption in favour of severability, while the new text is ambiguous and largely impracticable in that it leaves


197 The views expressed were very exactly equivalent in number in favour of one or the other extreme position. See Topical Summary of the Discussion Held in the Sixth Committee of the GA during its 65th Session (Doc. A/CN.4/638, at paras 19–24; for the reactions within the Sixth Committee see, in particular, Doc. A/C.6/65/SR.21; see also the comments received from Governments, Doc. A/CN.4/639, supra note 67, at paras 131–182. There were, however some bright exceptions of rare states trying to propose a compromise position, in particular Austria (see Doc. A/CN.4/639, at para. 133), Finland (ibid., at paras 137–145) or Switzerland (ibid., at paras 167–169).

the author of the invalid reservation free to ‘express at any time its intention not to be bound by the treaty without the benefit of the reservation’; this is difficult to reconcile with the temporal element in the definition of reservations or in the *chapeau* of article 19 of the Vienna Conventions; more critically it creates uncertainties on the principle of treaty commitment itself.

This shaky solution was probably the ‘least worse possible’ if one wanted to take into account the deep division between states on this quite crucial issue. And, unfortunately, it is unlikely that they will try to find any better compromise solution when the Guide to Practice is discussed again in 2013.\(^\text{199}\) In my experience, states are not much inclined ‘naturally’ to compromise when what they consider (often erroneously) as being ‘questions of principle’ are at stake, even when a compromise would clearly be in the common interest. And concerning guideline 4.5.3, the chances that they will not move an iota are all the more plausible that ‘the harm is done’: unless the General Assembly decides to convene a diplomatic conference (which would be absurd) or clearly reject the whole Guide to Practice (which is unlikely since it would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater for one or two guidelines some states disapprove of), the Guide exists; it is published as an official document of the General Assembly and it is probable that delegations in the Sixth Committee will consider that their only means of influence is to stick rigidly to their position in the hope that it will be taken into consideration in the future ‘implementation’ of this non-binding document. And the views expressed by the states in the Sixth Committee or outside should indeed be taken into consideration.

However – and quite unfortunately – the chances are better than not that, instead of trying to define a common (reasonable and consensual) position on the most difficult issues, the delegates in the Sixth Committee will, as usual, give such cacophonous speeches that the message will be inaudible. Therefore whether the General Assembly takes note of the Guide to Practice\(^\text{200}\) or not, it will live its own life; practice alone will be the judge of its adaptation to the needs of the international community of states (and international organizations) or whether it is desirable to adapt some of the rules it recommends following, to leave some aside or to adopt or progressively develop others. The non-binding nature of the Guide fits in this process of continuous adaptation.

\(^{199}\) The discussion planned for 2012 had to be postponed to 2013 because of the Sandy storm which ravaged New York in 2012 and compelled the shortening of the *ILC Rep.*

\(^{200}\) As the ILC recommended.
### Annex I: Table of Correlation between Guidelines and Articles of the Vienna Conventions

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<sup>201</sup> Unless otherwise mentioned, the numbering of the Articles is that of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties.
### Annex I continued

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<td>id.</td>
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202 All the documents are available on the website of the Commission: [www.un.org/law/ilc/](http://www.un.org/law/ilc/).